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George H. Troughton, A.B., Brown University 
M.B.A., Columbia University 
The objectives of this disseration are: (1) to analyze the investment 
performance of leveraged Dual Purpose Funds' capital shares; and (2), to 
provide an explanation of the discounts and premiums which investors place 
on capital share net asset values in the market. Dual Fund capital shares 
can loosely be described as 50% margin accounts since half of each Fund's 
initial capitalization consists of income shares viiich receive all of the 
Fund's income. 
Risk-adjusted investment performance of the seven Dual Fund capital 
share net asset values was analyzed relative to a sanple of ninety-four 
mutual funds from 1967 to 1973. The total sanple of funds was divided 
into risk categories provided by Wiesenberger. The research used non- 
parametric statistical techniques which appeared to be particularly 
well suited to inter-groip coitparisons of investment performance. 
The mean return of each fund was regressed on its respective risk 
proxy (beta coefficient). This cross section regression indicated that 
the risk-adjusted performance of high beta mutual funds was below that 
predicted by a Security Market Line, whereas the performance of lew beta 
mutual funds was above the predicted level. This result was reinforced 
by a non-parametric test across three different risk levels. Both tests, 
however, were inconclusive as to the relative ranJdjig of the Dual Fund 
capital shares. 
Investment performance of IXial Fund capital shares was corpared to 
that of ten random sanples of other funds. In ten separate non-overlapping 
caiparisons, leveraged Dual Fund performance could not be distinguished 
fron "average" fund performance. 
Dual Funds use a form of financial leverage to achieve high beta 
portfolios wh^eas other high risk mutual funds rely on the selection 
of risky securities. One possible explanation for the apparent differ¬ 
ence in performance resulting from the two high-risk strategies is that 
aggressive investors tend to over-inflate the prices of risky securities, 
vMch in turn tends to depress their risk-adjusted returns in the long 
run. Results of this study indicate that mutual funds vhich have high 
risk/high reward objectives shoiiLd eiiploy financial leverage rather than 
risky stock selection in order to obtain high beta portfolios. 
The causes of Dual Fund discounts and premiums are found in the 
interaction of institutional barriers to information and investor reactions 
to the leverage feature of the Funds. Noninal leverage ratios, based on 
net asset values, and effective leverage ratios, reflecting discounts and 
premiums, were regressed on total assets in time series regressions. 
Significantly Icwer coefficients of determination and flatter negative 
slope coefficients were obtained for effective leverage ratios. 
Inasmuch as the slopes of the effective leverage curves v/ere flatter 
than the nominal leverage curves, one can surmise that investors offset 
the natural leverage ratio changes which WDuld normally occur as net asset 
values change. In particular, the slcpe coefficients inply that discounts 
occur as asset values rise, and premiums occur as asset values fall. Since 
Dual Fund asset values are highly correlated with stock market indices, 
this finding suggests that demand for Dual Fund leveraged portfolios is 
greater at market troughs than at market peaks. Such countercyclical 
small investor behavior is consistent with research shewing odd-lotters 
as net sellers in bull markets and net buyers in bear markets. 
Examination of possible returns for potential Dual Fund capital 
shareholders reveals that the seven funds have similar long run rates 
of return to maturity. One of the stronger conclusions of this disser¬ 
tation is that discounts and premiums are used by investors as systematic 
and logical asset pricing mechanisms. 
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"The first rule of intelligent action by the 
enterprising investor must be that he will 
never embark upon a security operation which 
he does not fully comprehend and which he 
cannot justify by reference to the results 
of his own study and experience." 
Graham and Dodd, 1962 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Expanding price/earnings ratios, robust corpora'll earn¬ 
ings, and a low rate of inflation created a favorable common 
stock investment environment from 1950 to 1966. Throughout 
the 1960's, financial institutions capitalized on post-war 
common stock investment results by successfully promoting the 
sale of diversified common stock mutual funds. Mutual funds, 
as well as savings accounts, real estate, and life insurance, 
became core holdings in the small investor's asset portfolio. 
From 1960 to 1969, the number of individuals owning mutual 
funds increased from 4.3 million to 10.7 million, and mutual 
fund assets increased three-fold from $16 billion to $48 
billion. 
During the expansion phase, the mutual fund industry 
created new funds with varied investment objectives. Many 
small investors were attracted to mutual funds which stressed 
speculative objectives rather than long-term capital appreci¬ 
ation. In particular, so-called "go-go" funds emerged in the 
late 1960's. Whereas more traditional mutual funds invested 
for the long term on the basis of estimated intrinsic values 
of selected securities, "go-go" funds emphasized short-term 
performance. By rapid portfolio turnover and investment in 
small companies with thin capitalizations, these performance 
oriented funds realized high rates of return as long as the 
1960's bull market lasted. 
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Among the other speculative funds offered to the public 
were seven Dual Purpose Funds. These funds were closed-end 
and capitalized by one-half income shares and one-half capi¬ 
tal shares. For example, a fund might offer five million 
capital shares at $10 a share and five million income shares 
at $10 a share. Capital share net asset values include any 
capital gains generated by the $100 million fund. On the 
other hand, income shares receive all of the income on the 
$100 million over the life of the fund. In other words, a 
Dual Fund enables an investor to leverage himself with regard 
to his objective. Capital shares are in a sense borrowing 
income share dollars in pursuit of capital gains. For the 
capital shares, the fund achieves a high risk level through 
the use of leverage. The leverage of the capital shares is 
similar to that of a margin account with 50% equity. 
The seven Dual Funds issued in 1967 will mature between 
1979 and 1985, when the income shares are to be redeemed at 
par value. Capital shareholders will receive net asset 
value for their shares or they can vote to continue the fund 
as an unleveraged open-end fund. The income shares were 
guaranteed a specified rate of annual income return over the 
life of the fund which is carried in arrears if not paid. If 
there are arrearages when the fund terminates, the income 
shares will receive par value plus arrearages. 
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Dual Funds were greeted with great fanfare in the invest¬ 
ment world when they were issued in 1967. Profer.'.ors Shelton, 
Brigham, and Hofflander of UCLA Graduate School of Business 
hailed Dual Funds as "... perhaps the most important new de¬ 
velopment in the investment field during the first half of 
1967."^ ^ writer in Business Week indicated the level of in¬ 
terest in Dual Funds when he wrote that, "The so-called 'dual 
funds' first applied for registration with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission last November—and at once captured Wall 
« 
Street's imagination as the hottest new product to hit the 
3 
fund business in years." 
In the ensuing seven years. Dual Funds have failed to 
make an impact on the mutual fund industry. The primary fea¬ 
ture of the funds was leverage. However, the leverage factor 
has turned out to have a negative effect on investment results 
during a seven-year period when annual returns from common 
stocks have often fallen below the risk-free rate of return. 
Dual Fund capital shares have sold at discounts relative 
to net asset value for most of their existence. At the end of 
1973, discounts on six out of the seven funds ranged from 29% 
to 42%. As a practical matter, it would be difficult for an¬ 
other mutual fund management company to issue a Dual Fund when 
the outstanding Duals sell at discounts. Thus, Dual Funds may 
become a footnote to chapters on mutual funds in future in¬ 
vestment textbooks. 
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No prior empirical studies have been made of Dual Fund 
investment performance, nor have any writers provided a sat¬ 
isfactory explanation of Dual Fund discounts and premiums. 
Theobjectives of this research are to examine the risk-ad¬ 
justed investment performance of Dual Fund capital shares, 
and to develop a financial behavioral explanation of dis¬ 
counts and premiums. 
Purpose and Methods 
One of the major purposes of this research is to examine 
the returns of leveraged Dual Fund capital shares within the 
context of the returns predicted by the capital asset pricing 
model. Like warrants. Dual Funds provide information to cap¬ 
ital market researchers which goes beyond their immediate fi¬ 
nancial impact in the market place. The existence of dis¬ 
counts and premiums provides insights into investor reactions 
to the leverage feature. In addition, many bank trust depart¬ 
ments have set up quasi-Dual Funds with income beneficiaries 
of the trust on the one hand, and capital beneficiaries with 
residual rights to capital after the death of the income bene¬ 
ficiaries on the other. If Dual Fund managers are not able to 
successfully manage portfolios with two sets of conflicting 
objectives, bank trust officers can be expected to experience 
similar problems. 
Dual Fund performance data also provides the opportunity 
5 
for a direct empirical test of the expectations of the Tobin- 
Sharpe-Treynor security market line. The speculative "go-go" 
funds held risky stocks to maintain high risk portfolios and 
Dual Funds used leverage. Differences in the results of the 
two high risk strategies v/ill be examined. 
The capital asset pricing model holds that risk-adjusted 
rates of return tend to equality in the long run. This pro¬ 
vides the basis for an hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference in the risk-adjusted returns of mutual funds grouped 
as to risk level. An alternative hypothesis is suggested by 
the recent empirical findings of Black-Jensen-Scholes [10] and 
Kraus and Litzenberger [85] which indicate that stocks and 
portfolios with above average risk experience returns below 
those predicted by the capital asset pricing model, whereas 
those with below average risk experience returns above the 
predicted level. 
The general hypothesis regarding investment performance 
with respect to risk level is tested on a cross-section basis 
for a large sample of mutual funds, and also for the net 
asset values of Dual Fund capital shares. In the latter case, 
the a priori expectation is that there is no significant dif¬ 
ference in the performance of Dual Funds and the mutual fund 
sample based on capital market theory. An alternative hy¬ 
pothesis is provided by recent articles in the popular finan¬ 
cial press which have described Dual Fund capital shares as 
"sorry performers.""^ These articles implicitly suggest that 
6 
capital market theory does not hold in the "real world" be¬ 
cause of certain psychological reasons. This alternative hy¬ 
pothesis is that random samples of mutual funds outperformed 
Dual Fund capital shares on a risk-adjusted basis in the 
period from 1967 to 1973. 
Prior research on risk-adjusted investment performance 
suggeste that a rewarding investment strategy would be to 
leverage portfolios with low risk. This provides a testable 
hypothesis that the risk-adjusted performance of hypothetic- 
ally leveraged lower risk mutual funds was superior to the 
performance of the actual Dual Funds. The null hypothesis is 
that there is no significant difference in the performance re¬ 
sulting from the two leveraging strategies. 
Two additional hypotheses are tested with respect to the 
performance of Dual Funds. The first compares the risk-ad¬ 
justed performance of the leveraged capital shares to the per¬ 
formance of their respective total asset portfolios (with the 
leverage removed). The capital asset pricing model provides 
a null hypothesis that with risk-adjustment, there is no dif¬ 
ference in a given portfolio's return before and after lever¬ 
age. An alternative hypothesis is suggested by a number of 
investors who have adopted a policy of "undoing" the leverage 
feature by buying both capital and income shares. The alterna¬ 
tive hypothesis is that the unleveraged total asset portfolios 
experienced higher risk-adjusted returns than their respective 
capital shares. 
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The performance of the net asset values of Dual Fund 
capital shares should be reflected in the market prices that 
investors are willing to pay for the shares. The null hy¬ 
pothesis is that there is no significant difference in the 
risk-adjusted performance of Dual Fund capital share net 
asset values and their respective market prices. The alter¬ 
native hypothesis is that persistent discounts have functioned 
to yield lower risk-adjusted returns for market prices than 
for het asset values. 
The second major purpose of this study is to provide an 
explanation for Dual Fund capital share discounts and premiums. 
Dual Fund discounts appear somewhat illogical since rates of 
teturn to investors will eventually reflect net asset value 
rates of return as maturity approaches. In the past Dual 
Fund discounts have been related to the high risk of their 
leveraged portfolios. By discounting net asset values, in- 
vetors make possible high returns required as necessary com¬ 
pensation for high risk. However, this explanation does not 
account for why the fund with the largest decline in asset value 
sells rather consistently ^t a premium. Furthermore, all seven 
Dual Funds sold briefly at premiums in mid 1970. 
Lack of demand for capital shares causes discounts in 
the market place. Demand conditions could reflect poor past 
performance or investor ignorance. Alternatively, changes in 
demand for Dual Fund capital shares may reflect investor re¬ 
actions to leverage ratio changes within the fund. The hy- 
8 
pothesis tested is one which states that discounts and premi¬ 
ums function as a pricing mechanism which investors use to 
tip the leverage ratio in their favor based on expectations 
of future stock market prices. Such an hypo tte sis relies on the 
usual assumptions as to the homogeneity of investor expecta¬ 
tions . 
Structure of the Study 
Chapter II contains a review of the literature on the de¬ 
velopment of an investment performance measure. This chapter 
also contains a detailed description of Dual Funds and past 
research which may provide some insight into the nature of 
discounts and premiums. In Chapter III, the data collection 
and sampling stratification techniques are outlined. In addi¬ 
tion, a risk-adjusted performance measure is presented. The 
measure used in this study is one which takes account of fund 
mean return and systematic risk. 
Prior to the analysis of the risk-adjusted performance 
of Dual Funds and a sample of ninety-four other mutual funds, 
the use of non-parametric statistical techniques is discussed 
in Chapter IV. Non-parametric statistics provide a means of 
testing complex hypotheses regarding comparisons of invest¬ 
ment performance across different risk categories. 
In Chapter V, empirical investment performance results 
are presented and analyzed. The hypotheses regarding Dual 
Fund performance are tested. 
9 
Chapter VI contains the results of a statistical test 
of the hypothesis that discounts and premiums are a consequence 
of investor reactions to changes in Dual Fund leverage ratios. 
In addition, compound annual return opportunity sets for cap¬ 
ital shareholders of the seven Dual Funds to maturity are 
presented. 
In the final chapter, the results of the research are 
summarized and implications drawn from the results. An at¬ 
tempt is made to appraise the efficacy of the Dual Fund con¬ 
cept. Limitations on the generality of the research results 
are noted. 
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Footnotes 
The New York Stock Exchange has defined small investors 
as those with incomes below $20,000, portfolios under $10,000, 
and trades less than $5,000 a year. Source: The Wall Street 
Journal, June 24, 1974, p. 24. 
2 
J.P. Shelton, E.F. Brigham, and A.E. Hofflander, Jr., 
"An Evaluation and Appraisal of Dual Funds," Financial Anal¬ 
ysts Journal, 23:3, (May-June 1967), p. 131. 
3 
"Dual Funds Ready to Go," Business Week, March 18, 1967, 
p. 150. 
4 
See Fortune (152), and The Wall Street Journal, Decem¬ 
ber 31, 1973, p. 21. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
"All theories are abstract simplifi¬ 
cations of reality. No one theory en- 
compsses all aspects of anything, nor 
is the most elaborate theory expected 
to go unchanged with the subsequent 
evolution of thought. Accordingly, 
all existing features of capital mar¬ 
ket theory do not inherently corres¬ 
pond to reality equally well. What 
the authors do assume, however, is that 
there is a sufficient correspondence 
between reality and the extent of capi¬ 
tal market theory exposed herein to 
warrant the attention of the financial 
community." _ 
-Vasicek and McQuown^ 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a framework 
for the evaluation of Dual Purpose Funds. The development 
of a portfolio performance measure as an outgrowth of port¬ 
folio theory and the capital asset pricing model is out¬ 
lined in the first section. The second section contains a 
review of past studies of investment performance, particu¬ 
larly mutual fund performance. Section three contains a 
brief history and description of Dual Funds. In the final 
section, past studies on the pricing of non-leveraged 
closed-end funds are reviewed. Closed-end discounts and 
premiums may provide some clues to Dual Fund capital share 
discounts and premium. 
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less volatile portfolios when the market declined, and more 
volatile portfolios when the market advanced. In fact, only 
one out of fifty-seven funds' characteristic lines displayed 
any curvature. These results indicate that mutual fund man¬ 
agers do not successfully change portfolio risk levels in an¬ 
ticipation of stock market movements. 
Jensen presented two studies which contributed to the 
state of the art of portfolio performance measurement. His 
major contributions were the breadth of his studies (115 mu¬ 
tual funds which accounted for well over half of all mutual 
fund assets), and the use of beta coefficients rather than 
standard deviations as measures of risk. 
In his first article [71], Jensen purported to show that 
mutual fund managers were not able to earn returns which were 
higher than one would expect from the funds' risk level. By 
regressing the log relative returns of 115 funds on the S&P 
500 Index log relative returns from 1955 to 1964, he focused 
on the intercept term of the regression (a), or the existence 
of a non-zero constant, as a measure of over (a>0) or under 
(a<0) performance for a fund's risk level. He concluded that 
whether one measured returns net of expenses, or gross of ex¬ 
penses (i.e. adding back management fees, brokerage commis¬ 
sions, etc.), "...these 115 mutual funds were on average not 
able to predict security prices well enough to outperform a 
buy-the-market-and-hold policy, but also that there is very 
little evidence that any individual fund was able to do sig- 
24 
nificantly better than which we expected from random chance." 
Jensen's study is open to criticism, however. Using his 
reported t-ratios, it can easily be seen that only 17 out of 
the 115 funds had a's which were statistically significant. 
Approximately six would be expected by chance. 
In a later article [72] , Jensen presented his results in 
the form of the J measure described in Section I. He found 
that from 1955-1964 only forty-three mutual funds earned a re¬ 
turn greater than that expected from a market portfolio of 
equal risk (J>0), while seventy-two funds had lower returns 
(J<0). Measured before expenses, fifty-eight funds had J's>0, 
and fifty-seven funds had J's<0. 
In a 1970 study, Carlson [25] reviewed the performance 
of large samples of mutual funds in several over-lapping 
periods 1948-1967. Carlson found that high correlation co¬ 
efficients (r's) were obtained from cross section regressions 
of fund mean returns on their respective risk proxies, ^ the 
sample contains funds of varying risk levels. While he con¬ 
firmed the findings of other researchers that past performance 
results have little predictive value, he concluded that, "The 
issue of whether mutual funds outperformed 'the market' de- 
pends, in large degree, on the selection of both time period 
7 
and market proxy." 
This last point is reaffirmed in a study by Friend, Blume, 
and Crockett [57]. From their study of the monthly returns of 
136 mutual funds from 1960 to 1968, they conclude, "Mutual 
funds as a whole in 1960-1968 seemed to perform worse than 
25 
equally distributed random investments in New York Stock Ex¬ 
change stocks, but, except for low risk portfolios, did better 
than proportionally distributed random investments. Since 
previous studies had concluded that mutual fund performance 
was equivalent to that obtained from proportionally distribu¬ 
ted random investment in NYSE stock, the new results suggest 
g 
some improvement in fund performance in recent years." 
Critics of portfolio performance measures cite additional 
studies by Friend and Blume [56, 13]. According to Friend and 
Blume, if risk-adjusted measures of performance were unbiased, 
performance would be independent of the corresponding measure 
of risk. Using Sharpe's S, Treynor's measure, and Jensen's 
alpha, they found negative correlation between performance 
measures and risk for random portfolios from 1960 to 1964, 
and positive correlation from 1964 to 1968. However, their 
concluding note in [13] indicated that a somewhat improved 
measure could be obtained by comparing a portfolio's return 
with an equivalent risk market portfolio. The present study 
will make such a comparison in its use of the J performance 
measure. 
Finally in its 1971 Institutional Investor Study [126] , 
the Securities and Exchange Commission gave its approval to 
a performance evaluation which makes "...use of an unmanaged 
standard portfolio having volatility equal to that of the 
g 
managed portfolio..." The SEC study of 125 funds from 1960 
/ 
to 1969 contained results which conflict with the earlier 
26 
Sharpe and Jensen results. The SEC found that mutual funds 
tended to outperform market portfolios to the extent of an 
average excess return of 0.6 percent per year on an annual¬ 
ized basis. 
Concluding note. Research to date is inconclusive as to 
whether managed mutual fund performance is statistically dif¬ 
ferent from the performance of equal risk random or market 
portfolios. However, the objective of the present study is 
to evaluate Dual Purpose Funds within the context of overall 
mutual fund performance. Empirical findings support the hy¬ 
pothesis that rates of return are linearly related to risk. 
In particular, the relationship of returns and risk was as 
Sharpe and Treynor implied: in rising markets, high risk 
portfolios produce higher returns than low risk portfolios; 
in declining markets, high risk portfolios decline more than 
low risk portfolios. 
III. Dual Purpose Funds 
Background. The issuance of Dual Purpose Funds in 1967 
was encouraged by three factors; first, the Internal Revenue 
Service ruled in the late 1950's that mutual funds could re¬ 
tain capital gains if they paid capital gains taxes on the 
gains; second, aggressive investors who used leverage and 
margin accounts had profited handsomely from post-World War 
II stock market gains; finally. Dual Purpose Funds had been 
launched in Great Britain in 1965 and had proven popular with 
27 
British investors. 
American Dual Funds attracted a great deal of initial 
attention on Wall Street. Seven Dual Funds raised over $300 
million from capital and income shareholders in 1967. Capi¬ 
tal shareholders provide only one-half of the capitalization 
of the Dual Funds, but capital share net asset values reflect 
all of the capital gains. Similarly, income shareholders 
receive all of the income on the total capitalization. The 
seven funds had maturities of twelve to seventeen years. At 
maturity, income shareholders receive par value for their 
stock, and capital shareholders receive net asset value of 
their shares if the fund is liquidated. However, Dual Fund 
by-laws contain a provision whereby capital shareholders can 
vote to continue the fund as an open end non-leveraged fund. 
This provision would be particularly useful if fund maturity 
coincided with a bear market. 
The capital shares had great attraction for investors in 
high tax brackets who wanted to pursue long term capital gains 
without incurring ordinary income. Conversely, shareholders 
in low tax brackets or tax-sheltered investors could maximize 
current income. Thus at offering date. Dual Funds could 
loosely be described as 50% margin accounts which permitted 
small investors to place themselves in a conservative or ag¬ 
gressive point on the security market line. 
Just prior to the funds' offering in 1967, Shelton, 
Brigham and Hofflander [129] commented: 
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TABLE 2-1 
THE DUAL PURPOSE FUNDS 
Initial CAPITAL SHARES 
Total Initial Net 
Assets Net Asset Market 
(in Asset Value Price Discount 
FUND millions) Value 12-28-73 12 -28-73 12-28-73 
American 
Dual-Vest $ 43.2 $ 13.80 6.55 4 -5/8 29.4% 
Gemini Fund 36.4 11.00 11.25 7 -7/8 30.0 
Hemisphere 
Fund 32.1 11.44 .77 1 -3/8 78.6p 
Income & 
• 
Capital Shares 27.6 9.15 10.20 6 -3/8 32.5 
Leverage Fund 
of Boston 54.9 13.73 10.91 7 35.8 
Putnam Duo- 
Fund 2 7.5 9.12 6.87 4 41.8 
Scudder Duo- 
• 
Vest 99.8 9.15 9.73 6- -1/4 35.8 
P = premium 
INCOME SHARES 
Market 1973 Year Est. Yield 
Redemption Price Annual End To 
FUND* Price 12-31-73 Dividend Yield Maturity** 
American (1979) 15.00 11- 3/4 .87 7.4% 10.8% 
Gemini (1984) 11.00 13- 1/4 1.41 10.6 9.7 
Hemisphere (1985) 11.44 6- 5/8 .70 10.G 11.7 
Income & Cap.(1982)10.00 11 .95 8.6 7.9 
Leverage (1982) 13.73 12- 1/4 .97 7.9 10.4 
Putnam (1983) 19.75 17 1.34 7.9 7.5 
Scudder (1982) 9.15 7- 3/4 .665 8.6 9.0 
* Figure in parenthesis indicates year of fund maturity. 
** Approximate yield to maturity or internal rate of return 
based on minimum cumulative or current dividend rate. 
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"Thus dual funds serve the following purpose: they 
separate the total return obtained from common stocks 
into two components, each of which should have more 
appeal when available separately than exists when 
they can be obtained only in combination. The great¬ 
er appeal should arise from investor differences in 
tax brackets and attitudes toward risk. To the ex¬ 
tent to which this analysis is valid, it implies that 
the funds should, all other things being equal, sell 
at a premium. Specifically, this means that the 
total market price of the preferred plus the capital 
shares should exceed the market value of the underly¬ 
ing assets. (It does not necessarily follow that 
each component will, separately, sell at a premium.) 
From this analysis it comes as no surprise that 
English dual funds have been selling at a premium 
since they were floated. It will be interesting to 
see whether American dual funds, after they are 
issued, will in fact sell at a premium."10 
Since 1967, annual returns from investing in common 
stocks have been below expectations formed in the post-World 
War II bull market. Total annual returns (capital apprecia¬ 
tion plus dividends) for the S&P 500 Index are as follows: 
11.0 
-8.3 
4.0 
14.3 
19.0 
-14.8 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
As a result of mediocre stock market returns, the lever¬ 
aged capital shares of Dual Funds have not experienced high 
returns. At the end of 1973, only two of the funds' capital 
share net asset values exceeded original 1967 net asset val¬ 
ues 
Dual Fund capital and income shares sell on the stock 
market at prices which often vary from their underlying values. 
Income shares are similar to preferred stock with minimum cum- 
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ulative dividend requirements. However, unlike most pre¬ 
ferred stocks. Dual Fund income shares are entitled to any 
growth in portfolio income over the life of the fund. Nevertheless, 
the market prices of income shares, like preferred stocks, 
have fallen since 1967, largely because of rising interest 
rates. 
Potential conflicts of interest. One of the major con¬ 
cerns of the Securities and Exchange Commission was whether 
Dual Fund managers could serve both income and capital share¬ 
holders equitably^’^ In particular, the SEC was concerned that 
a fund's management would aggressively seek stocks with po¬ 
tential high capital gains, and ignore higher yielding se¬ 
curities because the capital shareholders elect a majority 
of the board of directors. According to Carr [26] this con¬ 
cern led the SEC to push for protection of income sharehold¬ 
ers with provisions for minimum cumulative income dividends. 
In addition/income shareholders can elect more directors if 
their dividends fall severely in arrears. Income share divi¬ 
dend requirements permitted by the SEC took either of two 
different forms. The funds could pay a minimum annual dollar 
amount (sometimes increasing over the years), or alternative¬ 
ly, provide a minimum dividend yield established by the Stan¬ 
dard & Poor's 500. In general,the income shareholders are 
paid after deduction of the management fee (usually one-half 
of one percent of total assets). As of the offering dates in 
1967, the current yields for income shareholders ranged from 
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4.5% to 7%.^^ 
The net effect of these provisions is that the income 
shareholders have a minimum floor on their income, with a po¬ 
tential for higher income if the portfolio asset base and/or 
dividends increase over time. 
Fund managers would probably be hesitant to comment on 
whether they emphasize capital gains once the income share 
dividend is secure. Officially, they are committed to treat¬ 
ing each class of stockholder equally. Nevertheless, the 
acceptance of the capital asset pricing model in its 1971 
Institutional Investor Study [126] suggests that even the SEC 
would not look with disfavor on a policy emphasizing capital 
gains if the income dividend appears secure. Such a policy 
would be in accordance with the premise that the capital 
shareholders bear almost all of risk of principal loss and 
thus are entitled to higher returns. 
The leverage factor. Perhaps the most misunderstood 
feature of Dual Funds is the leverage factor. Capital share 
leverage is defined as the ratio of total assets in the port¬ 
folio to capital share equity (total portfolio assets/net 
assets of capital shares). When the funds were originally 
issued with an equal amount of capital shareholder dollars 
and income shareholders dollars, the leverage for capital 
shareholders was 2:1. Many investors apparently assumed that if 
the leverage ratio remained constant, capital shareholder 
compound annual returns would be twice total portfolio re- 
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turns. However, for the capital shareholder, leverage is in¬ 
versely related to changes in portfolio assets. If the fund 
is initially leveraged at 2:1, leverage declines as fund 
assets rise because there are a constant amount of income 
shareholder dollars leveraging an increasing amount of capital 
shareholder dollars. On the other hand, as asset value falls, 
leverage increases. The relationship between the leverage 
ratio and portfolio asset changes is shown in Figure 2-3. 
This relationship is hereafter referred to as nominal leverage. 
However, effective leverage for a potential capital share¬ 
holder reflects any discount or premium in the ratio of market 
price to net asset value. Effective leverage is the product 
of nominal leverage times discount or premium. A discount in¬ 
creases effective leverage, and a premium reduces effective 
leverage. 
EFFECTIVE 
LEVERAGE 
In other words, for investors who purchase capital shares in 
the market, effective leverage depends on the ratio of total 
assets to market price rather than the ratio of total assets 
Total Assets 
(one income + 
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Calculating rates of return. Two approaches have been 
taken to the estimation of potential returns to holders of 
Dual Funds. Shelton, Brigham and Hofflander [129] simulated 
the returns to a hypothetical Dual Fund from investment in a 
diversified portfolio of 158 stocks from 1946 to 1965. Over 
the twenty year period, the returns to income shareholders 
before taxes was 12.7% compounded annually, while the returns 
to capital shareholders before taxes was 12.0%. However, 
from 1955 to 1965, the before tax returns to income share¬ 
holders would have been 7.1%, while the before tax return to 
capital shareholders would have been 12.3%. 
Capital shares bear almost all of a Dual Fund's risk, but 
capital share returns before tax do not always exceed income 
share returns. Any relative attractiveness of capital shares 
versus income shares is dependent on (1) the starting point of 
the. fund; (2) common stock prices over the life of the fund; 
(3) the growth of corporate dividends over the holding period; 
(4) the portfolio policies of the fund's management; (5) the 
tax bracket of the individual investor. 
Johnston, Curley and Mclndoe [75] present an alternative 
way of indicating possible returns for Dual Fund capital share¬ 
holders. Johnston et al. estimated the returns available to 
capital shareholders over a fifteen-year period assuming dif¬ 
ferent rates of growth for total portfolio assets. For ex¬ 
ample, if the portfolio grew at a 1% compound annual rate, the 
compound rate of growth for the capital shares would be 2%. 
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If the portfolio grew at a 5% rate, capital shareholder assets 
would grow at an approximate 7-1/2% rate. If the portfolio 
grew at a 10% rate, the capital shareholder assets would grow 
at a 14-1/4% rate. Note that the increments to capital share¬ 
holder compound annual returns due to the leverage factor are 
100%, 50%, and 43% respectively. 
From the standpoint of a potential purchaser of capital 
shares in 1974, the existence of a discount to net asset value 
changes the risk-reward opportunity set. Discounts enhance 
returns if asset values increase, and absorb some of the de¬ 
cline if asset values decline. A key feature of Dual Funds 
is that they will mature or become open-end between 1979 and 
1985. Thus Dual Fund capital shares are similar to deep dis¬ 
count bonds since the discount will be arbitraged away as re¬ 
demption date nears. 
As an example of how the discount changes the capital 
shareholder's opportunity set, consider two possible outcomes 
for the purchaser of capital shares selling at a discount of 
25% from net asset value of $10, with total portfolio assets 
of $20. If the portfolio increases in value in the future, 
current effective leverage is 2.67:1, rather than a 2:1 ra¬ 
tio indicated by the ratio of total portfolio assets to capital 
share assets. On the other hand, the discount lowers poten¬ 
tial downside leverage should the total portfolio decline. 
Total assets could decline as much as 13% over the life of the 
fund, and the capital shares would sustain no capital loss. 
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IV. A Brief Look at Closed-End Fund Discounts 
There are currently eleven closed-end diversified in¬ 
vestment companies which are not leveraged like the Dual 
Funds. Closed-end funds were started in the 1920's and have 
sold at discounts to net asset value in most years since the 
depression. These funds sell on the New York Stock Ex¬ 
change at a price set by supply and demand for their shares. 
Since the portfolios and investment performance of closed- 
end funds are similar to mutual funds, it seems illogical 
that they sell at a discount of 15% from net asset value 
(even after considering commissions), compared to open-end 
mutual funds which sell at net asset value plus commonly a 
6% to 8-1/2% load charge. 
Latane and Tuttle [86] have described sizeable discounts 
and premiums on closed-end funds as irrational. Malkiel [100] 
attributes the discount to the fact that brokers prefer to 
sell open-end funds at an 8-1/2% commission compared to the 
2%-3% commission on the purchase of closed-end funds on the 
New York Stock Exchange. 
Recent empirical work indicates that discounts (and occas- 
37 
sional premiums) are related to the performance and expected 
performance of the funds. Roenfeldt [122] found that closed- 
end funds which continuously sold at a discount experienced 
performance below that of a risk-adjusted market portfolio.. 
Boudreaux [16, 17] found that investor expectations of per¬ 
formance, as represented by proxies such as portfolio turn¬ 
over ratios, explained more than half of the variance of mean 
closed-end fund discounts over the period 1960-1970. Unfor¬ 
tunately, these studies do not contain an explanation of the 
sizeable variation from the mean discount which occurs for 
individual funds over time. 
Zwieg [159] used closed-end fund discounts as a techni¬ 
cal signal in the stock market. He assumed that investors in 
closed-end funds are "odd-lotters" whose expectations as to 
the future course of security prices are invariably wrong. 
Zwieg concludes that there is a high probability of a bear 
market when closed-end fund discounts narrow (i.e., odd-lotters 
are bullish). Nevertheless, a perusal of the swings in dis¬ 
counts does not seem to support the notion that discounts are 
a consistant leading market indicator. 
The research to d ate indicates that closed-end fund dis¬ 
counts are related bo investor appraisals of future income 
streams, discounted at an appropriate rate. The paradox that 
appraisals are reflected in the prices of closed-end funds, 
but not in the prices of open-end mutual funds, is easily ex¬ 
plained. If open-end funds were to discontinue "pegging" the 
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redemption price, their bid price would no doubt reflect pre¬ 
vailing investor consensus as to valuation of future income 
streams. In several quarters since 1970, open-end mutual 
fund redemptions have exceeded open-end fund sales. This 
phenomenon is an apparent reflection of the same small investor 
bearish sentiment that causes closed-end fund discounts. 
V. Perspective 
Portfolio theory provides an explanation of how risk- 
averse investors attempt to maximize their expected portfolio 
returns for a given risk level. The capital asset pricing 
model provides an explanation of how assets and portfolios will 
be priced if investors act in accordance with portfolio theory. 
By combining the two theories, analysts are able to describe 
a theoretical trade-off between risk and return which provides 
a benchmark for the measurement of managed portfolios. While 
the trade-off is not exactly as predicted by the models, em¬ 
pirical results show that portfolio theory and the capital 
asset pricing model bear a reasonable correspondence to stock 
market realities. 
This review of the literature contains a paradigm through 
which Dual Purpose Fund Capital Shares can be evaluated at ap¬ 
proximately the mid-point in their life-cycle. To date, there 
has not been a study of the investment performance of Dual 
Funds, nor has anyone provided an adequate explanation of their 
persistent discount. in the next two chapters, methods for the 
investigation of these questions will be presented. 
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Dual Funds, like most open-end and diversified closed- 
end funds, qualify as "regulated investment companies." 
These investment companies are relieved of income tax liabil¬ 
ities as long as they meet certain requirements. Among the 
principal requirements are: (a) the fund must distribute not 
less than 90% of its income in any taxable year; (b) at least 
50% of the fund assets must be "diversified," i.e., not more 
than 5% of the fund's assets can be invested in the securi¬ 
ties of one issuer, and the fund may not hold more than 10% 
of the voting securities of that issuer. 
Dual Funds are also limited to a 2:1 initial leverage 
factor under the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
12 
Only one fund, Scudder Duo-Vest, offered an income 
share yield greater than 6%. However, the Scudder prospectus 
clearly stated that the fund did not expect to earn the in¬ 
come dividend requirement of 7% in the early years of the 
fund. The amounts in arrearage would be paid in the later 
years or at redemption. 
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CHAPTER III 
MEASURING INVESTMENT COMPANY PERFORMANCE 1967-1973 
Sources of Investment Company Data 
In order to provide a comparative framework for evalu¬ 
ating the performance of the seven Dual Funds, a sample of 
ninety-four mutual funds was selected. Mutual funds report 
results on a regular basis as required by the Investment 
Company Act of 1940. 
The sample of ninety-four mutual funds was drawn on a 
stratified basis in order to include funds with different 
investment objectives and size. The sample was selected 
from the funds which are reported by Barron's on a quarterly 
basis. As a result, the selection procedure presents a po¬ 
tential sampling bias, but the problem is probably not seri¬ 
ous because Barron's includes almost all of the publicly 
held funds. 
At the end of 1972, there were 604 mutual funds but 
this figure is somewhat misleading since the largest fifty 
funds account for 66% of total mutual fund assets, and the 
largest 117 funds account for 84% of total mutual fund assets. 
The sample of ninety-four includes funds of all sizes, but 
the percentage in size category roughly corresponds to their 
importance in overall mutual fund assets (see Table 3-1). 
Total assets represented in the sample of ninety-four funds 
equal $42.3 billion or 67.5% of overall mutual fund assets of 
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$62.5 billion. 
TABLE 3-1 
MUTUAL FUND SIZE CATEGORIES (12/31/72) 
Size of Fund 
No. of 
Funds 
Total 
Assets 
(Bils.$) 
% of 
Total 
Assets 
No. of Funds 
in Sample 
Over $1 Bil. 14 $23.2 37.2% 13 
$500 Mil.-$1 Bil. 14 10.0 15.9 12 
$300 Mil.-$500 Mil. 22 8.3 13.3 15 
$100 Mil.-$300 Mil. 67 10.9 17.5 24 
$ 50 Mil.-$100 Mil. 66 4.8 7.7 14 
Below $50 Mil. 421 5.1 8.4 16 
604 $62.3 100.0% 94 
Source: Wiesenberger Services Inc., Investment 
Companies 1973 
The second objective in selecting the sample of mutual 
funds was to structure the sample to include representative 
funds from different investment risk categories. Wiesen- 
berger [154], a so-called bible of the mutual fund industry, 
annually classifies funds in terms of investment objectives 
as reflected by the portfolio's•characteristics. Recently, 
Wiesenberger has considered fund volatility, or riskiness, 
as one of the primary criteria for fund classification. 
Table 3-2 contains the six Wiesenberger classifications as of 
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TABLE 3-2 
MUTUAL FUND CLASSIFICATION BY OBJECTIVE (12/31/72) 
Wiesenberger No. of Funds Total Assets % of 
Classifica- Wiesenberger in Sample of Funds in Sample 
tion by Mean Beta from Classi- Sample Assets 
Objective 12/69-2/73 fication (Bils. $) in 
Classi¬ 
fication 
Maximum Capital 
Gain; volatility 
generally high 1.30 14 $1,428 3.4% 
Large Growth Funds 1.15 17 13,421 31. 8 
Long Term Growth of 
Capital and Income; 
volatility moder¬ 
ately above average 1.08 10 3,475 8.3 
Diversified Common 
Stock Funds-A-objec- 
tive: growth and 
current income; 
volatility average .95 28 14,002 33.1 
Diversified Common 
Stock Funds-B-objec- 
tive; growth, in¬ 
come, and stability; 
volatility below 
average .85 13 4,212 9.9 
Balanced Funds- 
Common Stocks 
and Bonds .75 12 5,769 13.5 
94 $42,307 100.0% 
Source of Classification Data; Wiesenberger Services Inc., 
Investment Companies 1973 
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the end of 1972, and the number of funds in the sample from 
each classification. 
The Wiesenberger classifications are used in the analy¬ 
sis which follows. The mean beta for each classification in 
column 2 of Table 3-2 indicates that Wiesenberger's classifi¬ 
cations correspond to the relative volatility of each classi¬ 
fication in recent years. However, the classification of in¬ 
dividual funds is somewhat more arbitrary since Wiesenberger 
did not place each individual fund in a given classification 
exclusively on the basis of its beta. Table 3-3 is a list of 
each fund in the ninety-four fund sample by Wiesenberger 
classification, dollar value of total assets, and an identi¬ 
fication code number which is used throughout the forthcoming 
analysis. Table 3-3 also contains identification codes for 
the net asset values of the seven Dual Fund capital shares. 
The analysis which follows in chapters five and six is 
based on quarterly performance data for twenty-five consecu¬ 
tive quarters beginning with the third quarter of 1967 and 
ending with the last quarter of 1973. The starting point co¬ 
incides with the first quarter that all of the Dual Funds 
were in operation. Quarterly net asset values for the funds 
as of the last trading day of the quarter were obtained from 
Barron's. Income dividends and capital gains dividends paid 
in each quarter for the mutual funds were obtained from Fund- 
scope magazine. 
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TABLE 3-3 
THE MUTUAL FUND SAMPLE 
Maximum Capital Gains (series code 2000) 
Fund Name 1972 Yr. end 
Fund Assets 
(mils $) 
Admiralty Fund-Growth Series $ 23 
American Investors 207 
Axe-Houghton Stock F. 88 
Channing Special 106 
Chase Fund of Boston 110 
Fairfield Fund 49 
Imperial Growth 23 
Knickerbocker Growth 11 
Lexington Research 144 
Penn Sq. Mutual 160 
Scudder Special 218 
Security Equity 134 
Twentieth Century Growth 18 
Value Line Special Situations 137 
Large Growth Funds (series code 1000) 
Anchor Growth $ 495 
Channing Growth 316 
Chemical Fund 928 
Delaware Fund 530 
Fidelity Capital 635 
Ivestor's Var. Pay. 1,127 
Ivest Fund 371 
Keystone K-2 369 
Keystone S-4 814 
Mass. Inv. Growth 1,593 
National Investors 1,116 
Oppenheimer Fund 602 
Putnam Growth 884 
Rowe-Price Hew Horizons 511 
Technology Fund 665 
T.R. Price Growth 1,371 
United Accumulative 1,093 
Fund I.D. 
Code 
2168 
2179 
2186 
2201 
2203 
2242 
2413 
2417 
2292 
2323 
2342 
2345 
2452 
2377 
1182 
1198 
1205 
1222 
1243 
1278 
1283 
1291 
1289 
1299 
1306 
1321 
1334 
1340 
1367 
1328 
1372 
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TABLE 3-3 (continued) 
Long Term Growth of Capital and Income (series codp, 3000^ 
Fund Name 
1972 Yr. end 
Fund Assets 
(mils $) 
Fund I 
Code 
Colonial Growth Shares $ 78 3208 
De Vegh Mutual Fund 112 3223 
Dreyfus Fund 2 ,301 3226 
Energy Fund 157 3236 
Johnston Mutual Fund 333 3285 
Loomis-Sayles Capital Dev. 82 3294 
Newton Fund 28 3313 
Philadelphia Fund 109 3324 
Stein, Roe & Far. Stk, Fund 202 3789 
Value Line Fund 55 3378 
Diversified Common Stock Funds -A (Series code 4000) 
American Express Stk. Fund $ 79 4178 
Bullock Fund 190 4193 
Channing Common Stk. Fund 30 4200 
Crown West Diversified 17 4398 
Eaton & Howard Stk. Fund 246 4230 
Fidelity Fund 933 4244 
Financial Industrial Fund 328 4247 
Founders Mutual 207 4254 
Fundamental Investors 1 ,058 4257 
General Securities 8 4409 
Hamilton H-DA 643 4266 
Imperial Growth 48 4270 
Investment Co. of Amer. 1 ,621 4274 
Investment Trust of Boston 80 4275 
Investor's Stk. Fund 2 ,807 4277 
Keystone S-1 66 4287 
Mass. Investor's Trust 2 ,100 4300 
MIF Fund 231 4303 
One William Street 335 4319 
Pioneer Fund 255 4327 
State St. Investment 479 4357 
Scudder Common Stk. Fund 176 4344 
Selected American Shares 208 4348 
Sovereign Investors 10 4447 
Washington Mutual Investors 358 4381 
Windsor Fund 554 4383 
Wisconsin Fund 36 4384 
United Income 899 4373 
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TABLE 3-3 (continued) 
Diversified Common Stock Funds -B (series code 5000) 
Fund Name 
1972 Yr. end 
Fund Assets 
(mils $) 
Fund I 
Code 
Affiliated Fund $1,679 5169 
Amer. Mutual Fund 408 5180 
Broad Street Investing 468 5192 
Colonial Fund 215 5207 
Composite Fund 49 5217 
First Investor's Fund 32 5249 
Dividend Shares 415 5224 
Group Sec. C.S. Fund (US Life 
C.S.) 335 5261 
Guardian Mutual Fund 63 5265 
Istel Fund 141 5282 
Knickerbocker Fund - 12 5417 
National Sec. Stk. Fund 337 5307 
Pine Street Fund 58 5326 
Balanced Funds (series code 6000) 
Amer. Express Investment $ 173 6176 
Axe Houghton A 65 6185 
Boston Foundation 46 6190 
Channing Balanced Fund 98 6199 
Dodge & Cox Balanced Fund 17 6400 
Eaton & Howard Balanced Fund 167 6228 
Investor's Mutual 3,008 6276 
Loomis-Sayles Mutual 179 6295 
G. Putnam Fund 479 6333 
Scudder Balanced Fund 98 6343 
Stein Roe & Far. Balanced 209 6360 
Wellington Fund 1,230 6382 
Dual Purpose Funds-Net Asset Values of Capital Shares 
(series code 7000) 
Amer. Dual Vest Cap. Shs. $ 45 7100 
Gemini Gap. Shs. 55 7200 
Hemisphere Cap. Shs. 22 7300 
Income & Cap. Shares Inc., 
Cap. Shs. 37 7400 
Leverage Fund Cap. Shs. 64 7500 
Putnam Duofund Cap. Shs. 27 7600 
Scudder Duo-Vest Cap. Shs. 119 7700 
/ 
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The data on the ninety-four mutual funds for twenty-five 
quarters were generated in order to analyze the performance of 
the seven Dual Funds during the same period. Net asset values 
and market prices of Dual Fund capital shares were obtained 
from Fundscope^ Barron’s, and The Wall Street Journal. Net 
asset values for Dual Funds are reported on Fridays; there¬ 
fore, quarterly data for Dual Funds reflect net asset values 
and market prices as of the last Friday in the quarter. The 
risk-adjusted performance for the seven Dual Funds capital 
share net asset values will be considered relative to the 
risk-adjusted performance of the mutual fund sample of ninety- 
four. The objective is to determine the relative investment 
performance for funds of various risk levels in order to 
reach conclusions regarding the effect of risk level on per¬ 
formance . 
Measuring Quarterly Returns 
Two methods of calculating periodic investment returns 
have been employed in empirical studies. The use of an arith¬ 
metic mean rate of return or a geometric mean rate of return 
(also known as the compound rate of return) has been a lively 
controversy in ^finance literature. Empirical studies of in¬ 
vestment performance are approximately evenly divided between 
those that use arithmetic mean returns (see Sharpe [134], 
McDonald [104], Black-Jensen-Scholes [10]), and those which 
use geometric mean returns (see Jensen [71](72], and Carlson 
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[25]). Friend and Blume [56] and Sharpe and Cooper [137] use 
both and show the differences in performance which result. 
The arithmetic and geometric return measures use the 
same value relative for each investment period, which includes 
the change in net asset value during the period and any divi¬ 
dends paid during the period. For mutual funds, a fund's 
quarterly rate of return is: 
N.A.V.^ + C.G.Div.^ + I.Div.^ 
N.A.V. 
t-1 
(3a) 
where: 
R = a fund's rate of return during the tth period; 
i 
N.A.V.net asset value at the end of the 
tth period; 
C.G.Div. = capital gain dividend (if any) paid 
to the fund's shareholders during 
tth period; 
I.Div. = income dividend (if any ) paid to the 
fund's shareholders during the tth 
period. 
In calculating the mean return over a number of quarters, 
the arithmetic average is an unweighted average of the 
1 ^ 
Ra = - Z (3b) 
" t=i ^ 
The geometric mean return, on the other hand, is found 
by: 
_ n 
R^ = [ n (1+R ) ] 
5 t=i ^ 
l/n 
- 1 (3c) 
n N.A.V..+C.G.Div. tl.Div. ,/ 
= r n (__ _ ~)] ^ - 
t=l t-1 
N.A.V. 
1 (3d) 
50 
For computational purposes, the antilog of the average of the 
logarithms of is often used: 
^1 
ln(l+Rg) = Z i ln(l+R ) (3e) 
t=l ^ ^ 
The geometric mean rate of return is best described as 
the continuously compounded rate of return during the perform¬ 
ance measurement interval. The geometric return assumes all 
income and capital gains dividends are reinvested in the fund 
during the interval. 
Modigliani and Pogue have recently described the arith¬ 
metic mean return as follows, "The arithmetic average can be 
thought of as the mean value of withdrawals (expressed as a 
fraction of the initial portfolio value) that can be made at 
the end of each interval while maintaining the principal in¬ 
tact. 
The use of an arithmetic average in measuring investment 
returns produces a well-known tendency to overstate the true 
return as variance increases. The geometric return will al¬ 
ways be less than the arithmetic return unless all values of 
the periodic return distribution are equal. Young and Trent 
[158] prove that the geometric mean return is positively re¬ 
lated to the arithmetic mean and absolute skewness, and nega¬ 
tively related to variance and absolute kurtosis. However, 
they also show that the relationship between the geometric 
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mean and arithmetic mean can be approximated by; 
Rg = (Ra^ - Var.Ra)^^^ (3f) 
when the distribution of R 's approaches normality. 
As Jensen [72] and Latane and Avera [87] show, the geo¬ 
metric mean return is consistent with an investor's utility 
function when measuring his realized compound rate of return 
from the point of purchase to the point of sale. Thus the 
geometric mean return is often called a single period utility 
terminal wealth ratio. When a fund pays no dividends, calcu¬ 
lating the mean quarterly geometric return over n periods 
with equation (3d) results in the mean rate of return being 
equal to the nth root of the ratio of ending net asset value 
to beginning net asset value minus one, because the cross-pro¬ 
ducts cancel out: 
Rg 
N.A.V.^ N.A.V.2 N.A.V.^ 
N.A.V.q ^ N.A.V.“ ^ N.A.V.2 
N.A.V. 
’n.a.v. 
n 
n-1 
1 
n 
-1. 
Since capital shares of Dual Funds pay no dividends, the 
geometric rate of return for the capital shares for twenty- 
five quarters would be equal to: 
.N.A.V. 12/31/73,^^^^ 
^N.A.V ^ 9/30/67^ • 
The stock market rallied strongly in the third quarter 
of 1973 and then declined sharply in the fourth quarter. 
Using the geometric mean with September 30, 1973 as the cut¬ 
off date would overstate the relative investment performance 
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of the leveraged Dual Funds, while using December 31, 1973 as 
the cut-off date would understate performance of leveraged 
funds.^ 
In order to avoid this timing problem, this study will 
use Ra, equation (3b), as the measure of central tendency for 
twenty-five quarters. As Williamson has pointed out, "The 
arithmetic average is the 'most likely' or 'expected' rate of 
return in any single year. If all you know about the profit¬ 
ability of a fund is its rate of return in each year over a 
sample period of years, then the best guess as to what the 
return on the fund will be in any one year is generally the 
arithmetic average over the sample period. 
The Risk-Adjusted Performance Measure 
The rationale for a risk-adjusted investment performance 
measure based on a fund's average return and its beta coeffi¬ 
cient was developed in Chapter II. In this study the esti¬ 
mate of systematic risk for each fund is based on a least 
squares linear regression of the twenty-five quarterly re¬ 
turns (R^'s) for a particular fund on the corresponding re¬ 
turns of a market portfolio as represented by the Standard & 
5 
Poor's 500 Composite Stock Index. The S&P 500 Index is com¬ 
posed of 425 industrials, 20 railroads, and 55 utility stocks 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The weight of each 
stock in the index is proportional to the total market value 
of the company's common stock. The S&P 500 (M) quarterly re- 
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turn is: 
(3g) 
where 
RM^ = estimate of the return on a market 
portfolio during the tth period; 
S&P500 = level of the S&P 500 Index at end of the 
tth period; 
= the S&P 500 Index dividend as estimated 
by a 12-month moving average adjusted 
to the Index weightings. 
The regression equation for each fund's expected quar¬ 
terly return is given by: " 
Rj. = a + 3.(RM.) + e . 
-•t j t j 
(3h) 
A financial interpretation of the regression model's outputs 
for each fund j is; 
Rj = estimated return for fund j in the tth period 
based on its relationship with the returns of 
the S&P 500 Index; 
a = the intercept term or constant term of the 
regression; 
3. = the systematic risk proxy or beta coefficient; 
^ the proportion of fund j's returns systematic¬ 
ally related to the market index; 
e. = the residual variance term; the specific risk 
^ of fund j unrelated to changes in the market 
index. 
A fund's mean quarterly return and its estimated beta 
coefficient are used to compare the performance of the fund 
with a specific point on the security market line. The SML 
is estimated by a line which connects the quarterly risk-free 
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rate with the mean quarterly rate of return on a market port¬ 
folio. 
For the period September 30, 1967 to December 31, 1973, 
the average risk-free rate of return is estimated at 1.25% 
quarterly. This represents the average quarterly passbook 
rate at a savings bank during the period. For the small in¬ 
vestor who usually buys mutual funds, a savings account repre¬ 
sents the viable risk-free investment alternative. 
The mean rate or return for the S&P 500 Index for the 
same period was 1.0875% per quarter. Over the sampling in¬ 
terval, the security market line had a slight negative slope 
of -.1625 per unit of risk as shown in Figure 3-1. 
The interval over which this study was conducted included 
two bear markets (early 1969 to mid 1970, and most of 1973). 
When ex post data is drawn from bear market periods, market 
returns are likely to be below the risk-free rate. The nega¬ 
tively sloped ex post security market line indicates that high 
risk portfolios are estimated to yield lower returns in bear 
markets than low risk portfolios. 
The negatively sloped ex post SML in no way contradicts 
the expected long run positive trade off of risk and return. 
The bear market sampling period merely represents a short run 
phenomenon. As Francis concludes, 
"The assets with high systematic risk will experience 
high returns in a bull market; so r^ and will be 
positively related during bullish periods. During 
bearish times, assets with high systematic risk will 
experience the largest price declines and negative 
THE ESTIMATED EX-POST 
SECURITY MARKET LINE 
SEPTEMBER 30.1967 - DECEMBER 31,1973 
PERCENT 
QUARTERLY 
RETURN 
IRi) 
R, 
X- 1 
fVI= 1.09 
1.0 RISK (BETA) 
FIGURE 3 - 1 
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returns. Thus, assets with high 3's will have the 
lowest r., and cov(r.,3.) will be negative during 
bearish period. Howivet, this is no reason to 
doubt that investors demand high average returns 
to accept large systematic risks. In an ex ante 
sense cov(r.,3.) may be positive, while empirical ^ 
estimates ot it are negative during bearish times." 
Individual fund performance is indicated by a comparison 
of the fund's mean return with the return on an equivalent 
risk point on the estimated ex post SML. 
J. = Ra. - [(1-3.)R.+RM3.] 
J J 3 f 3 
(3i) 
When the actual mean return of a given fund, Ra^, is 
greater than the expected per.formance as estimated by the 
bracketed right hand side of equation (3i) , the fund's 
is positive. IVhen the fund's mean return is below that es¬ 
timated by its equivalent risk market portfolio, the fund's 
Jj is negative. Hence, J is an index number v/hich summarizes 
the risk-adjusted performance of each of the 101 funds over 
the twenty-five quarter period from September 1967 to Decem¬ 
ber 1973. 
Additional Considerations in Measuring 
Investment Performance 
The negatively sloped security market line increases the 
returns of funds which paid out large capital gains during 
the period. No assumptions are made in this study as to what 
individual investors did with the capital gains distributions 
made by a given fund. Therefore, funds which realized and 
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distributed large amounts of capital gains during good mar¬ 
kets had less at stake in subsequent bear markets. On the 
other hand, funds which did not realize net capital gains 
(i.e., sell more stocks in their portfolios which had gains 
than had losses) were fully exposed to bear markets.Nevertheless, 
the act of net capital gains realization is a management var¬ 
iable, and a fund's performance should reflect all management 
variables.^ 
As regulated investment companies, mutual funds are re¬ 
quired by law to pay out 90% of income received by the fund to 
their shareholders. Capital gains may either be paid out to 
shareholders, or the fund may pay capital gains taxes at the 
highest personal rate (currently 35%) in order to retain and 
reinvest the capital gains. Almost all mutual funds pay out 
capital gains in the form of dividends, but Dual Funds retain 
them in order to maximize long term leverage benefits. When 
a Dual Fund pays capital gains taxes, a capital shareholder 
reports his proportionate share of the tax as a credit on his 
own return, after including his share of the gain on Schedule 
D. If his personal capital gains tax rate is lower than the 
maximum, he in effect receives a refund. The capital share¬ 
holder also writes up the cost of his shares to reflect the 
taxes already paid. 
This study will not make any assumptions as to Dual Fund 
shareholder tax brackets. By adding back to net asset value 
any capital gains taxes paid by Dual Funds, their quarterly 
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returns are made comparable to other mutual funds. 
As a practical matter, the result of such an adjustment 
has been minor except in the case of Gemini Fund capital 
shares, where capital gains taxes totaled $3.20 a share over 
the years 1967-1972. In fact, all of the Dual Funds realized 
large capital losses as a result of the 1973 bear market, and 
under existing tax law, the funds can use these realized cap¬ 
ital losses to offset capital gains (if any) in the next four 
years. 
Mutual fund managers sometimes protest the use of a per¬ 
formance standard based on a buy-and-hold market portfolio 
(such as the S&P 500), because there are no expenses associ¬ 
ated with the maintenance of the market portfolio. Fund man¬ 
agement fees are approximately equal to 1/2 of 1% of total 
net assets. Other fund expenses, notably brokerage commis¬ 
sions, often bring total portfolio expenses up to 1% of total 
assets. 
Fund managers seem to miss the point of performance mea¬ 
surement. Presumably their professional management and trad¬ 
ing activities are directed at returns greater than could be 
obtained from a buy-and-hold market portfolio. Therefore, the 
equivalent risk market portfolio provides a benchmark for pro¬ 
fessionally managed funds in order to determine if investors 
receive any benefits from that management. Nevertheless, 
readers should keep in mind that fund performance after ex¬ 
penses is being compared to a market portfolio v/ith no such 
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expenses. This is somewhat unrealistic since there would be 
some expenses associated with maintenance of the desired risk 
level, and some clerical expenses associated with dividend 
collection and payment, as well as keeping investors and the 
SEC informed as to the fund's results. 
No adjustment is made in this study for any commissions 
or load charge paid by investors who buy mutual funds from 
security salesmen (often as high as 6% to 8-1/2% of net asset 
value). The ninety-four fund sample contains both load and 
no-load funds. No distinction is made in this study between 
the performance of load and no-load funds, but returns real¬ 
ized by investors are obviously reduced by any load charge. 
Conclusion 
The performance model developed in this chapter produces 
a risk-adjusted performance score, J, which can be used to 
rcuik order the 101 fund sample. The six Wiesenberger classi¬ 
fications permit analysis of the sample according to risk level. 
While the performance measure is based on funds' mean re¬ 
turn and beta coefficient, the complete performance model pro¬ 
duces additional outputs which are of interest. Among these 
are a standard deviation of quarterly returns as an indication 
of fund variance, and a coefficient of determination which in¬ 
dicates the degree of diversification relative to a market 
portfolio. In addition, standard error statistics, t tests, 
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and F tests are available in order to determine the statis¬ 
tical significance of the stochastic variables. 
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Footnotes 
Ori® is not subtracted frorn the value relative when 
computing the geometric rate of return. 
2 
F. Modigliani and G.A. Pogue, "An Introduction to Risk 
and Return: Concepts and Evidence," Financial Analysts Jour¬ 
nal , (30:2) March-April 1974, p. 69. 
3 
The implication is that a mutual fund salesman who 
wanted to impress a client with a given fund's performance 
would use a geometric mean return beginning in a bear market 
quarter, and ending in a bull market quarter. To overcome 
this problem, the geometric mean could be modified so that 
the quarterly returns are estimated by a time series regres- 
_ n 
sion. For example, R = ( n ( 
^ t=l 
cations of the geometric mean deserve further research effort. 
4 
J.P. Williamson, Investments, New Analytic Techniques, 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 259. 
5 
A fund's total risk or standard deviation, 
1 — 1/2 
o - Z (R -R )] ' , IS also computed and discussed later. 
^ t=l ^ 
^J.C. Francis, Investments: Analysis and Management, 
(New York: McGraw-PIill, Inc., 1972), p. 465. 
7 
When the sampling period overlaps with a bull market, 
the returns of funds which do not pay out large amounts of 
capital gains are increased. 
o 
In fact some institutions, notably the Wells Fargo 
Bank and American Express, have announced plans to offer 
market portfolio "Index Funds". 
A 
l+R-j^-l. Clearly such modifi- 
CHAPTER IV 
DISTRIBUTION-FREE STATISTICS AND THE ANALYSIS 
OF INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE 
Why Non-Parametrics 
Non-parametric or distribution-free statistics have been 
used extensively in behavioral research, but their use in 
financial studies has been limited. Non-parametrics are par¬ 
ticularly applicable when making comparisons of risk-adjusted 
performance scores for mutual funds. The performance scores 
can be easily rank ordered and non-parametrics permit testing 
of general hypotheses regarding rank order patterns in the 
entire sample, or patterns of rankings among sub-sample groups. 
A primary advantage of rank order non-parametric tests is that 
they permit the researcher to test complex hypotheses regard¬ 
ing the interaction fund performance and fund risk category 
more directly and understandably than with ANOV or other re¬ 
lated parametric tests. Non-parametrics also provide a con¬ 
venient method of testing differences among small samples. 
Parametric t-tests, on the other hand, rely on restric¬ 
tive assumptions which are seldom met in measuring investment 
performance. One such assumption is that fund performance in 
any group is normally distributed. The small number of Dual 
Funds makes the normality assumption urtrealistic. A second 
parametric assumption regarding equality of variance among 
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fund groups is also suspect. Variance around the group mean 
for high risk funds is likely to be greater than the variance 
around the group mean for low risk funds. 
The parametric assumption of independence of fund returns 
deserves more detailed discussion. In the mutual fund indus¬ 
try, it is typical for a management company to offer several 
funds to a public — a balanced fund, a diversified growth- 
income fund, and a growth fund. Since the different funds 
typically pick stocks from the same "approved purchase list," 
generated by the same investment research department, their 
portfolios often contain the same stocks. For example, both 
a balanced fund and a growth fund might contain IBM and Gen¬ 
eral Motors, but the balanced fund will have a greater pro¬ 
portion of its portfolio in General Motors, while the growth 
fund will have a greater proportion of IBM. In this study of 
101 funds, for example, there are four funds managed by 
Scudder Stevens & Clark - The Scudder, Duo-Vest Fund, the 
Scudder Common Stock Fund, the Scudder Special Fund, and the 
Scudder Balanced Fund. Several other management companies 
also have two to four funds represented in the sample, and 
strict independence of their portfolios cannot be assumed. 
The lack of independence in mutual fund portfolios is an in¬ 
teresting area of research which warrants further study. 
The Jonckheere Test of Rank Order Differences 
The statistics generated by the 101 fund sample are eas- 
64 
ily rank ordered. The funds can be ranked by mean return, 
beta coefficient, standard deviation, etc. However, the sum¬ 
mary risk-adjusted performance measure, J, is the logical 
focal point of the analysis. When the funds are ranked by 
their J's, the objective is to see if there is any perceptible 
pattern in the rankings. 
The 101 funds can be partitioned into risk groups using 
the Wiesenberger classifications. The Dual Fund capital 
shares are among the highest risk groups, while balanced funds 
represent the lowest risk group. The Jonckheere test [76] can 
be used to determine whether the rankings of funds is random 
or dependent on risk category. In particular, the null hy¬ 
pothesis is that the performance rankings of 101 funds is ran¬ 
dom with respect to risk category. If the rankings do not 
appear to be random, then the question is whether the depar¬ 
ture from randomness lends support to an alternative hypothe¬ 
sis that performance of mutual funds from 1967 to 19 73 v/as in¬ 
versely related to risk level. 
The procedure is to determine the sampling distribution 
of a statistic which represents the null hypothesis that all 
possible permutations of the 101 ranks in n risk categories 
are equally likely. A value for the null ^nd its var¬ 
iance (V ) is then calculated, along with a value (P^^) which 
represents actual rankings of a predicted ordering. The test 
of significance of a predicted (Pj^^) is given by the Z trans¬ 
formation : 
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P 
Ha 
5 - P 
Ho 
Z (4a) 
^ o 
The only assumption required for the Jonckheere test is that 
the sampling distribution of performance scores is approxi¬ 
mately normal. This is a reasonable (and usual) assumption 
with samples as large as 101 funds. 
1 
/ 
Testing Differences in Performance of Unrelated Samples 
While the Jonckheere permits generalization as to the 
performance of funds as risk Jevel increases, it does not 
permit generalization as to the performance of any single risk 
category. The particular category of primary interest is the 
Dual Fund sample. The objective is to determine if there are 
any significant differences in the performance of the capital 
shares of the seven Dual Funds compared to ten separate 
random samples of seven funds (obtained by sampling without re¬ 
placement from the ninety-four funds). The null hypothesis, 
that the rankings of Dual Funds and the rankings of a random 
group of seven other funds do not differ significantly, is 
tested separately ten times. The alternative hypothesis is 
that the performance of the random group of seven funds is 
fetatistically superior to the performance of the seven Dual 
Fund capital shares. 
The statistical test employed is the Mann-Whitney U Test. 
The ranks of the seven Dual Funds are compared to the ranks 
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of seven other randomly drawn funds. The value of the U test 
statistic is given by the number of times a rank of a Dual 
Fund precedes the rank of funds in the random group. Mann- 
Whitney U test statistic tables have been developed to give 
the probabilities associated with observed valued of U. The 
more often the ranks of Dual Funds are greater than the ranks 
of the random funds, the larger the U-value obtained. The 
higher the U-value^the greater the probability that the null 
hypothesis of no difference in the ranks is true. 
The Mann-Whitney test, which involves only minimal as¬ 
sumptions as to independence, is known to be one of the best 
non-parametric tests in regard to power efficiency. In cases 
where the data can also be analyzed by the parametric t-test, 
the Mann-Whitney U test has been found to approach the power 
efficiency of the t-test.^ 
Testing Differences in Performance of Related Samples 
The outline of the study to this point has compared the 
investment performance of Dual Fund assets to the asset values 
of other groups of mutual funds. However, the effective rate 
of return for any shareholder who does not hold Dual Funds 
until redemption date is determined by what he could get for 
his shares in the market place. A test is needed to determine 
whether the performance of the market prices of Dual Fund cap¬ 
ital shares is significantly different from the performance 
of their net asset values. A non-parametric test which tests 
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differences in related samples is required. 
The Wilcoxon Matched-Pair Signed-Ranks Tests is a power¬ 
ful test of such differences because it takes account of the 
relative magnitude as well as the direction of differences in 
performance. The market price performance scores (J's) of the 
seven Dual Fund capital shares can be compared to the corres¬ 
ponding Dual Fund's net asset value J scores. The null hy¬ 
pothesis is that there is no difference in the J's of the 
matched pairs. An alternative hypothesis, which specifies 
that one group's performance scores are greater than its cor- 
responding group's performance scores, will be accepted if a 
large number of its J scores exceed the J scores of its coun¬ 
terpart, and the relative magnitude of the difference in 
scores is large. 
I 
The same Wilcoxon matched pairs test can be used to test 
for differences in the performance scores of the net asset 
values of Dual Fund capital shares as compared to the per¬ 
formance scores of the total assets of Dual Funds where the 
quarterly return from total assets equals: 
T.A. + I.DIV 
R = -- - -1 , (4b) 
where: 
T.A. = Net asset value of one capital share 
+ par value of one income share + any 
arrearage on the income share's dividend; 
I.DIV = income dividend paid on income share- . 
holder during the tth period. 
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This is equivalent tty the return on the fund without any 
leverage. In other words, the Wilcoxon test will be used to 
determine whether the risk-adjusted performance of Dual Funds 
would have been higher if the leverage factor had been removed. 
As a practical matter, an investor could effectively "undo the 
leverage" on his own by buying an equal amount of income shares 
and capital shares. 
Summary 
Non-parametric statistics make it possible to test com¬ 
plex hypotheses regarding differences in fund performance 
while relying on minimal assumptions. Inasmuch as precise 
estimates of fund performance scores can be made, the non- 
parametric tests employed are among the most efficient in 
terms of power. 
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Footnotes 
^See Siegel (138) 
p. 830. 
p. 126, and Hayes and Winkler (65), 
CHAPTER V 
THE RELATIVE INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE OF DUAL PURPOSE 
FUND CAPITAL SHARES IN A SAI^PLE OF 101 FUNDS: 
EFFECTS OF LEVERAGE 
The Distribution of Fund Returns Relative to the Market 
Quarterly returns for each of the 101 funds, including 
the seven Dual Fund's capital shares, were computed using 
equation (3a) for the period September 30, 1967 to December 
31, 1973. The twenty-five quarterly returns for each fund 
were then regressed on the corresponding quarterly return of 
the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Index. Fund arithmetic 
mean quarterly returns were also computed. 
The rank orders of the 101 fund mean quarterly returns 
from 1967 to 1973 are presented in Table 5-1. The S&P 500 
Index had a mean return of 1.0875% per quarter, and a stan¬ 
dard deviation of 7.3% during the same period. In the 101 
fund sample, the median quarterly mean return was 0.73% per 
quarter, and the fund mean returns ranged from 1.92% to 
-3.15%.^ Inasmuch as the sampling period included two severe 
bear markets, only twenty funds had mean returns which exceed 
the risk-free rate of return of 1.25% per quarter, and seven¬ 
teen funds had negative mean quarterly returns. The seven 
Dual Fund's capital share net asset value (series code 7000) 
mean returns appear to be well distributed among the sample 
mean returns, ranking 11, 12, 41, 54, 68, 93, and 100. 
TABLE 5-1 
RANKS OF 101 FUND MEAN QUARTERLY RETURNS AND 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS IN THE INTERVAL 
September 30, 1967 to December 31, 1973 
Fund Mean Std.Dev. a 
Code Return a Rank 
1 1 340 1.9176 14.8561 1 1 • 
2 3285 1.7428 9.5071 40 
3 1 20 5 1.7406 7.5543 81 
4 51 92 1.6341 7.2831 86 
5 4327 1.5765 8.0042 67 
6 6295 1.5755 6.4304 95 
7 5224 1.5053 6.6356 91 
8 5282 1.4964 8.7100 53 
9 4303 1.47 1 4 7.54 63 82 
1 0 3313 1.3907 13.0327 1 8 
11 7400 1.3599 17.8757 4 
12 7200 1.3383 16.9650 8 
13 6333 1.3343 6. 1970 98 
14 5326 1.3271 8.2206 63 
1 5 3789 1.3157 9. 0 307 50 
16 6360 1.2757 7.5063 84 
17 4381 1.2716 7.7603 73 
1 8 1 32 8 1.2663 10.0041 29 
1 9 1 334 1 .2630 8.2273 62 
20 1306 1.2533 9.5992 37 
21 431 9 1.2336 7.6021 7 8 
22 43 9 8 1.1771 9.5392 39 
23 6228 1.1717 5.4588 1 0 1 
24 4244 1.1621 7.5774 80 
25 3294 1. 1351 9.8644 32 
26 4270 1 . 1223 7.62 2 1 77 
27 4287 1.1138 6.510 8 93 
28 2452 1.1126 17.5521 5 
29 4384 1.1020 7.5892 79 
30 1 299_- 1.0751 9.2030. . 46 
31 4373 1.0595 7.7624 72 
32 5180 1.0551 7.7035 76 
33 5169 1.0381 7.7367 74 
34 5265 1.0356 • 8. 5498 5 6 
35 4193 1.0084 8.9882 51 
36 3324 . 99 74 9.8643 33 
37 640 0 . 9840 6.4214 96 
38 4357 .9810 9.1270 49 
39 4383 . 9095 8.9529 52 
40 526 1 . 8895 6.4986 94 
41 770 0 . 8854 14.2 65'7 1 5 
42 4254 . 8771 7,0980 87 
43 1 32 ! . 77zin 10.4162 0 . . V 
44 54 1 7 . 841 2 8.4328 5 8 
45 6276 .8350 5.5753 100 
46 6343 . 7055 6.8641 89 
47 5 30 7 . 7652 7 . 7 0 3 71 
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6176 .7380 6.5975 92 
50 2292 .7342 9.5429 38 
51 4300 . 7095 7.5161 53 
52 1372 .7015 9.4181 43 
53 4277 .6760 S. 3279 59 
5A *^500 . 6403 17.1071 7 
55 520 7 .6359 7.4343 85 
w ^ 6382 .6291 6.3429 97 
57 2186 .6140 9.4137 44 
58 4274 . 5922 8.6965 54 
59 2413 .5393 10.2376 2 7 
60 4247 . 5295 7.9134 70 
61 3223 . 5127 9.9831 30 
62 1291 .5114 10.977 c 24 
63 6199 .4829 5.9388 99 
64 1367 .4754 9.1732 47 
65 6190 .4595 7.9669 69 
66 234 5 .440 1 12.6620 1 9 
67 1273 . 3307 1 0.0 0 80 28 
AO 760 0 . 31 94 1S.1886 3 
69 1 222 .3 1 33 9.4325 42 
70 4344 .3017 9. 6502 36 
71 4230 .2713 ■ 8.1360 65 
72 4447 .2600 6.8359 90 
*^3 3236 .2551 8.0 692 66 
74 6! 85 . 20 89 9.7059 0 r 
7A 5249 .2020 9.364 0 45 
76 2342 .20 0 6 11.9252 21 
•7 7 420 0 . 1 768 7.7246 7 5 
78 521 .1474 9.4508 41 
70 4266 .1126 8.60^6 55 
SO 4170 . 1 032 9.1715 4 8 
81 707 A . 0990 8.2575 60 
82 22 0 3 .0970 14.9298 1 0 
07 w w 320 8 . 0 880 9.5777 3! 
84 232 3 . 0 655 8.5058 57 
85 1243 -.0657 7.9773 68 
OA 1283 -.081 8 10.9452 2 5 
07 425 - . 1 50 6 8.^38® 61 
83 4348 -.2022 8. 1817 64 
89 24 1 7 -.2109 14.5489 1 2 
90 1289 -. 236 15.9591 0 
91 3373 -.3853 14.4316 1 3 
92 220 1 - .40 0.3 14.3063 1 4 
93 710 0 -.4512 22.1041 2 
94 2242 -.7901 13.9721 1 6 
95 1 1 98 -.8092 11.6933 2 2 
96 1 1 82 -1.1856 11.2775 2 3 
97 440 9 -1.4679 9.8055 34 
98 2 1 7 9 -I.4888 1 2.0 0 40 2 0 
99 2377 -2.4912 17.3428 6 
1 00 7 7 0 0 -2."75^ T ^ 07 5 = > -r • ^ 1 
1 0 1 216^ - 3.14^5 13.6275 1 7 
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The standard deviation of each fund's mean return is also • 
shown in Table 5-1. The figure to the right of the standard 
deviation indicates the rank order of the standard deviation. 
The four funds with the highest standard deviations are Dual 
Funds, and all of the Dual Funds are among the highest fifteen 
standard deviations. However, a number of other mutual funds 
had variations in their returns which were equal to, and in 
some cases greater than, the leveraged funds. This indicates 
that some mutual funds are employing very risky portfolio 
strategies without using leverage. The median standard devi¬ 
ation for the 101 funds was 9.0% with a range of 38.3% for the 
most variable fund to a low of 5.5% for the least variable 
fund. A summary of the return and standard deviation results 
for the sample is presented in Table 5-2. 
TABLE 5-2 
SUMMARY OF QUARTERLY RETURNS 
101 Funds Sept. 30, 1967 - December 31, 1973 
101 Fund Sample S&P 500 Composite Index 
Mean 0.54% 1.09% 
Median 0.73 
Range 
Interquartile Range 
1.92 - 
1.12 - 
(3.15)* 
0.20 — 
Standard Deviation Mean 10.1% 7.3% 
Standard Deviation Median 9.0 — 
Range of Std. Dev. 38.3 - 5.5 — 
Interquartile Range of 
Std. Dev. 10.4 - 7.7 — 
*Brackets ( ) indicate negative value 
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Table 5-3 contains the correlation statistics for each 
of the 101 fund returns and the S&P 500 Index returns. The 
funds are rank ordered by the coefficient of determination 
2 
(r ). The correlation coefficients (r) range from .73 to .99, 
2 
with a median of .92. The r s range from .53 to .98, with a 
median of .85. Mutual fund returns are highly correlated 
with the returns of the market index, and an average 85% of 
the variation of a representative fund's returns is accounted 
for by its association with the market. Some 75% of the 101 
2 
funds had r 's ^ .80. The F-test of the statistical signifi- 
cance of the linear regression of fund returns on the S&P 500 
returns range from a high of 1,017.4 to 26.1. All of the 101 
F-values are statistically significant at the .01 level 
(F=6.9). The correlation results indicate that the model com¬ 
paring fund performance with a market portfolio of equivalent 
risk is a valid standard. In addition, since the S&P 500 
2 
Index represents a high level of diversification, the high r 
values indicate that mutual funds successfully achieve diversi¬ 
fication. 
The 101 funds have a wide range of variance around their 
respective regression lines. The range is 268.9 to 1.0 with 
a median of 12.4. The variance around the regression line 
appears to be greater for the Maximal Capital Gains and Dual 
Fund groups (series codes 2000 and 7000) than for diversified 
and balanced funds (series codes 5000 and 6000). 
75 
TABLE 5-3 
RANKS OF CORRELATION STATISTICS: 101 FUND RETURNS RELATIVE 
TO S&P 500 INDEX RETURNS FOR QUARTERLY INTERVAIB 
September 30, 1967 to December 31, 1973 
Fund 0 F-Test of Variance 
Code 
z 
r r Regression of Fit 
1 5224 . 9779 . 9839 1017.3501 1.0158 
2 427 7 .9653 . 9825 640.6084 2.5083 
3 4254 .9588 . 97 92 535.2943 2.1658 
4 4373 . 9577 . 9786 520.6809 2.6599 
5 6382 . 9549 . 9772 486.730 9 1.8943 
6 6176 . 9526 . 9760 462.2813 2. 1528 
7 5192 .9516 . 9755 452.3023 2.6784 
8 4230 . 9496 .9745 - 433.0048 ' 3.4838 
9 430 0 . 942 1 . 9706 374.5475 , 3.4104 
10 4357 .940 9 . 9700 366.1542 5.1374 
1 1 6333 .9391 ' . 9691 354.6361 2.4406 
12 4287 .9373 . 9681 343.6646 2.7747 
13 4257 . 9287 . 9637 299.6664 5.0487 
14 4275 . 9282 .^634 297.2318 - 3.5617 
15 6295 . 9281 . 9634 296.9328 3.1019 
16 4266 .9279 . 9633 295.8949 5.5760 
1 7 41 78 . 9232 . 960 8 276.3472 6.7440 
1 8 6360 . 9222 . 9603 270.7656 4.5722 
1 9 7700 . 9214 .9599 ■ 269.7334 16.6837 
20 4244 .9182 . 9582 . 258.1125 4.9020 
21 5265 . 9175 .9578 255.7047 6.2948 
22 4193 .9170 . 9576 . 254.0913 6.9973 
23 4344 . 9156 . 9569 249.6422 8.1978 
24 3294 . 9153 . 9567 248.3866 8.6053 
25 1278 .9114 . 9547 236.6991 9.2563 
26 6343 .9107 . 9543 234.4164 4.3928 
27 3789 .9103 . 9541 233.5074 • 7.6303 
28 5180 . 901 0 . 9492 209.3608 6.1299 
29 320 8 .90 10 . 9492 209.2798 10.0813 
30 431 9 . 3939 . 9481 204.4334 6.0985 
31 750 0 . 8969 . 9470 200.0079 31.4953 
32 1243 . 8953 . 9465 197.7399 6.9189 
33 6276 .8941 . 9456 194.2513 3.4339 
34 5326 . 8927 .9448 . 191.3879 7.5652 
35 4270 . 8908 . 943 8 137.7059 6.6174 
36 1372 .885 0 . 940 7 177.0150 10.6434 
37 6228 . 8846 . 94 0 5 1 76.27 1 4 3.5588 
38 3223 .8 344 . 9404 175.9557 12.0221 
39 64 0 0 .882 8 . 9396 173.2120 5.0 4.3 7 
40 61 99 . 8822 . 9393 172.3116 4.3340 
41 3226 ..8817 . . . . . . 92 90'. . 171.4708 8.4353 
42 71 00 .880 1 . 9331 ■ 1 6 8. 8 1 53 61.1328 
43 720 0 . 8739 .9348 159.4353 37.8627 
44 12 9 9 , C7 3/. . ^3 4 6 1 5 5^. 73^7 11.1^49 
45 53 0 7 . 8696 . 9325 153.4267 8.2135 
46 52 0 7 .^61 3 . 9281 142.8635 7.9973 
47 516 9 . 8 580 . 9263 139.0024 8.5674 
48 4381 . 857 0: .9262 ' • 138.7561 8.9353 
49 3285 .8545 .9244 1 1 135.1132 . 13.7196 
50 1306 . 8522 . 9232 132.6381 14.2089 
51 521 7 . 8490 . 9214 129.3178 14.0733 
52 1 334 . 8474 . 9205 127.6826 10.7810 
53 5261 . 845 4 .9195 125.7876 6.8122 
54 4447 . 8413 . 91 72 121.9149 7.7391 
55 1367 . 8412 . 9171 121.8015 13.9621 
56 3236 .8389 .91.59 1 1 9. 7Z-75 10.9471 
57 4383 . 8356 .9141 116.9249 13.7480 
58 4247 .8355 .9141 116.8148 10.7495 
59 52 82 .8325 .9124 114.2954 13.2615 
60 4348 . 8320 .9122 ’ 113.9282 11.7330 
61 430 3 .831 6 .9119 113.5455 10.0092 
62 1 1 82 . 8306 .9114 112.8126 22.4949 
63 54 17 . 8292 .9106 111.6658 12.6736 
64 1321 .8282 .9101 110.3788 19.4501 
65 1328 .8273 . 9096 110.2031 18.0318 
66 7300 . 8241 . 9078 107.7620 268.9308 
67 4398 .8238 . 9076 107.5011 16.7347 
68 3324 . 81 95 . 90 52 104.4064 1 8. 3296 
69 760 0 . 8182 . 90 46 103.5212 62.7546 
70 2292 . 81 28 .9016 99.8919 17.7848 
71 1222 . 80 85 .8992 97.1187 17.7767 
72 1283 . 3075 . 8986 96.4823 24.0634 
73 6190 .8061 . 8978 95.6106 12.8429 
74 740 0 . 8055 . 8975 95.2682 64.8438 
75 2203 . 8038 . 8965 94.2239 45.6358 
76 4327 . 8036 . 8964 94.0860 13.1325 
77 1 198 .8018 . 3954 93.0302 28.2821 
78 420 0 .80 12 .8951 92.7131 12.3761 
79 4274 . 800 5 . 8947 92. 2 87 6 15.7441 
30 2342 .7927 . 890 3 87.9246 30.7743 
81 1205 . 790 6 . 8591 86.8245 12.4710 
82 440 9 . 7902 . 8889 86.6281 21.0489 
83 1291 . 7517 . 8841 82.3400 27.4568 
84 2345 .7751 .8 804 79. 2720 37.6236 
85 24 1 7 . 770 7 . 8779 77.2850 50.6568 
86 61 85 .7584 . 8708 72.1849 23.7530 
87 21 79 . 735 8 .8578 ' 64.0610 39.7225 
88 1 340 .7352 . 8574 63. 84 93 60.9896 
QO 224 2 .7191 . 8480 ■ 58. 8804 , 57.2206 
90 241 3 .7155 . 5459 57.^388 31.1163 
91 1289 .70 75 .8412 55.6448 • 77.7242 
92 23 7 7 .7069 . 8408 55.4631 91.9994 
93 3378 . 6898 . 8306 51. 1543 67.4069 
94 220 1 .6857 . 8281 50.1889 67. 1 20 1 
95 4384 . 670 6 .8189 46. SI 65 19.7993 
96 232 3 . 666 5 . 8164 45.9593 25.1795 
97 2186 . 6551 . 8094 43.6862 31 . 893 I 
98 2168 .6516 . 8072 43.0202 67. 50 93 
99 5249 .6256 .7 909 38.4315 • 34.2569 
1 on 3313 . 5698 . 7548 30.4622 • 76.2488 
1 0 1 24 52 .5318 • '^293 6. 12 92 1 “ 5 . 6 “ 7 
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TABLE 5-4 
SUMMARY OF QUARTERLY CORRELATION RESULTS 
For 101 Funds and the S&P 500 Index 
September 30, 1967 - December 31, 1974 
o Variance 
r r F-Value of Fit 
Median .85 .92 132.6 12.4 
Range .98-.53 .99-.73 1,017.4-26.1 268.9-1.0 
Interquartile 
Range .91-.80 .95-.90 234.4-94.2 25.2-6.6 
Estimated intercept terms for the 101 regressions, ranked 
on the basis of a, are listed in Table 5-5. The intercept 
term indicates the extent to which the average return on a 
given fund differs from its expected return relative to the 
market index. As such, a could be an indicator of superior 
(6t>0) or inferior (d<0) performance. Twenty-three funds had 
positive a's, and seventy-eight had negative a's. However, 
the standard errors of a were in general very high and only 
fifteen 'funds had statistically significant Ci' s (i.e., t^2.0). 
One fund had a positive a which was significant, and fourteen 
funds had significant negative a's. Five statistically sig¬ 
nificant a's would be expected by chance alone. 
TABLE 5-5 
RANKS OF REGRESSION INTERCEPT TERMS (a): 101 FUND RETURNS 
RELATIVE TO S&P 500 INDEX RETURNS FOR QUARTERLY INTERVALS 
September 30, 1967 to December 31, 1973 
Fund 
Code 
/N 
a aa 
OOL 
Rank t of a 
1 1205 .740 7 . 7144 49 1.0369 
2 6295 . 6533 . 3563 92 1.8336 
3 5192 .57 64 . 331 1 94 1.7411 
4 5224 . 52 85 . 2039 1 0 1 2.5920 
^ 5 4327 . 50 54 . 7331 46 . .6935 
6 4303 . 4470 . 640 0 59 . 6984 
7 6333 . 4404 .3160 97 1.3934 
8 3255 .4345 . 7493 44 . 5799 
9 6225 .40 74 . 3 832 57 1.0631 
10 5282 .3134 . 7367 45 . 4254 
1 1 6360 .2026 - .4326 84 . 4685 
12 4381 .2016 . 6047 61 . 3334 
1 3 4354 . 1 768 . 900 1 31 . 1 964 
14 4287 . 1754 . 3370 93 .5206 
1 5 5326 .1708 .5564 70 . 3070 
16 431 9 .1606 .4996 78 . 3216 
1 7 1334 . 1356 . 6642 55 . 2041 
18 640 0 . 0858 .4543 52 . 1 889 
19 4244 .081 2 .4479 83 .1813 
20 4270 .0513 .5204 75 . 0986 
21 6276 . 0 502 . 3749 90 . 1 339 
22 3759 . 0 331 . 5588 69 . 0592 
23 1 340 .0214 1 .5798 1 2 .0135 
24 5261 -.0000 . 5280 73 -.0001 
25 5169 -.0287 . 6024 62 -.0477 
26 5180 -.0335 . 50 0 9 77 -. 0669 
27 1306 -.0659 . 7625 40 -.0864 
28 4373 -.0713 . 3299 95 -.2162 
29 331 3 -.0738 1.7665 5 -.0418 
30 1 323 -.0853 . 5590 34 -.1028 
31 4395 -.1115 . 8276 37 -.1351 
32 4254 -. 1576 .2977 98 -.5292 
33 6343 -.1796 . 4240 55 -.4236 
34 5265 - . 1 83 5 . 5075 76 -.3615 
35 1299 -.2053 . 6766 53 -.3034 
36 61 76, -.2206 .2968 99 -.7432 
37 ,42 7 5 -.2263 .3818 88 -.5928 
3 8 3294 -.2697 . 5934 63 -.4545 
39 4193 -.2729 . 5351 71 -.5100 
40 6382 -. 2936 . 2784 100 -1.0545 
41 5417 -.3020 . 7202 45 -. 4193 
42 4383 -.3085 . 750 1 43 -.4117 
43 530 7 -.3135 .*='793 65 -.5407 
ZiZl 3324 - . 33 1 9 . 866 1 33 -.3833 
45 4357 -.3369 . 4535 80 -.7349 
46 61 99 -.3475 .4211 86 -. 82 52 
47 430 0 -.3564 . 3736 91 -.054 1 
48 520 7 -.3 912 . 5721 67 -.6838 
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49 21 86 5203 1.1424 20 -.4554 
50 132 1 -.5372 . 8922 32 -.6021 
51 4277 -.5421 . 3204 96 -1.6919 
52 22 92 -.5466 . 8531 35 -.6407 
53 4247 -.5473 . 6633 56 -.8252 
54 4274 -.5661 .8027 39 -.7052 
55 61 90 -.6053 ■ . 7250 47 -.8350 
56 1372 -.6175 . 6600 57 -.9356 
57 4447 -.6733 . 5628 68 -1.1965 
58 2413 -.7493 1.1284 22 -.6644 
59 1367 7777 . 7559 42 - 1 . 0288 
60 2452 -.8255 2.5241 2 -.3270 
61 3236 -.8451 .6693 54 -1.2626 
62 4200 -.8526 .7117 50 -1.1980 
63 3223 -.8849 .70 14 51 -1.2615 
64 5249 -. 90 05 1 . 1840 1 9 -.7606 
65 4230 -. 90 90 . 3776 89 -2.4073 
66 1291 -.9334 1.0600 25 -.8806 
67 1222 -.9493 . 8529 36 -1.1130 
68 232 3 -.9682 1.0151 26 -.9538 
69 720 0 -1.0226 1.244 8 1 7 -.8215 
70 740 0 -1.0284 1.6290 9 -.6313 
71 61 85 ^1.0493 .9859 28 -1.0643 
72 3226 -1.0566 .5875 64 -1.7984 
73 4344 -1.0729 . 5792 66 - 1.8524 
74 1278 -1 . 091 7 .6155 60 -1 . 7737 
75 4266 -1.1217 .4777 79 -2.3482 
76 52 1 7 -1.1489 . 7589 41 -1.5139 
77 770 0 -1 . 1 530 . 8263 38 -1.3954 
78 1243 - 1.1897 . 532 1 72 -2.2357 
79 41 78 -1.2086 .5253 74 -2.3006 
80 2345 -1.2194 1.240 8 1 3 -.9827 
81 320 8 -1.3077 . 6423 58 -2.0360 
82 4348 - 1.3 1 32 .6929 52 - 1.8951 
83 42 5 7 -1.3326 .4545 81 -2.9317 
84 2342 -1.3801 1.1222 23 -1.2298 
85 1283 - 1 .5460 . 9923 27 -1.5579 
PA • > 780 0 -1 . 77 1 z. 1.!353 21 -1.5603 
87 220 3 -1.8956 1.3666 1 5 -1.3871 
88 241 7 -2.1123 1.4398 1 4 - 1.4670 
89 760 0 -2.1298 1.6025 1 0 - 1.3290 
90 220 1 -2.1640 1.6573 p -1.3057 
91 3378 -2.1696 1.6609 7 -1.3063 
92 1289 -2. 233 1 1.7335 4 -1.2532 
93 1 1 96 -2.3679 1.0758 24 -2.2010 
94 2242 -2.5539 1.5302 1 3 -1.6689 
95 I 1 82 -2.7164 . 9595 29 -2.8311 
96 440 9 -2.7655 . 9281 30 -2.97 97 
97 21 79 -3.0217 1.2750 I 6 -2.2700 
98 710 0 -3.5381 1.5817 1 I -7.2269 
99 2377 -4.6618 1.9403 0 -o. ziO 26 
100 2168 -4.737! 1.6621 6 -2.88^1 
1 0 1 7 o n n -7.9584 2.31 '"5 1 _ 0, '> c c - 
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TABLE 5-6 
SUMMARY REGRESSION RESULTS 
The Intercept Terms (a) For A Sample of 101 Funds 
September 30, 1967 - December 31, 1973 
Intercept St. Error 
a 
t-test of 
/N 
a 
Median 
Range 
Interquartile 
(0.54)* 
40.74-(7.96) 
0.71 
3.32-0.20 +2.59-(2.98) 
-0.71 
Range (0.03)-(1.12) 1.02-0.52 (0.0 5)- (1.34) 
*( ) indicate negative value 
Table 5-7 contains a rank order of the regression co¬ 
efficients (betas) for the 101 return regressions. The betas 
ranged from a high of 4.76 to a low of 0.70. The market 
portfolio has by definition a beta of 1.0. Funds with betas 
greater than one represent funds which are more volatile than 
the market, and funds with betas less than one represent funds 
which are less volatile. The median beta of the 101 fund sam¬ 
ple was 1.14, and sixty-eight funds had betas which were 
greater than one. Past studies of mutual fund performances 
have generally indicated that more mutual funds have betas 
below one than above one. The SEC's 1971 Institutional In¬ 
vestor Study of mutual f\ind volatility 1960 to 1969 showed 
that of 108 diversified funds (i.e. non-income funds), sixty- 
five had betas less than one and forty-three had betas greater 
2 
than one. The results presented in Table 5-7 provide a small 
amount of evidence that mututal fund portfolios have become 
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TABLE 5-7 
RANKS OF REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (3): 101 FUND RETURNS RELA¬ 
TIVE TO S&P 500 INDEX RETURNS FOR QUARTERLY INTERVALS 
September 30, 1967 to .December 31, 1973 
Rank 
Fund /N 
of 
/N 
Code 3 a3 C73 t of3 
' 1 730 9 4.7570 . 4582 1 10.3808 * 
2 710 0 2.8387 .2185 11 12.9929 * 
3 760 0 2.2522 .221 4 1 0 10.1745 * 
4 750 0 2.2178 . 1 568 21 1 4. 1 42 4 * 
5 740 0 2. 1963 .2250 9 9.7605 * 
6 720 0 2. 171 1 .1719 1 7 12.6268 * 
7 2377 1.9961 .2680 3 7.4474 * 
8 770 0 1.87 45 .1141 38 16.4236 * 
o y 1289 1.8377 .2464 4 7.4595 * 
10 220 3 1.8324 . 1 888 1 5 9.7069 * 
11 2452 1.7822 . 3487. 9 5.1117 
13 241 7 1.7484 . 1 989 14 8.7912 ■k 
1 3 1 340 1.7437 .2182 12 7.9906 ■k 
M 3378 1.6409 . 2294 7 7 . 1522 it 
1 5 2242 1.6220 .2114 1 3 7.6734 it 
1 6 220 1 1.6218 . 22 89 8 7.0844 
1 7 23 4 5 1.5260 .17 14 1 8 8. 90 35 it 
1 8 2168 1.5959 . 2296 6 6.5590 
1 9 234 2 1.4535 .1550 23 9. 3768 it 
20 1 1 98 1.4333 . 1486 24 9.6452 it 
21 21 79 1.40 96 .1761 16 8.0038 
22 1 1 82 1.4077 . 1 325 29 10.6213 it 
23 331 3 1.3467 .2440 5 5. 51 93 
1283 1.3464 . 1 371 27 9.8225 
25 1291 1.3286 . 1 464 2 5 9.0741 
26 1 278 1.3080 . 0 859 60 15.3850 it 
27 1 32 1 1.2977 . 1 232 32 10.5299 
2 8 3294 1.2919 . 0820 63 15.7603 * 
29 3223 1.2852 . 9 969 51 13.2648 it 
30 320 8 1.2835 . 0887 5 8 14.4665 it 
31 4344 1.26 4 1 . 0 80 0 66 1 5. 80 0 1 it 
32 1 32 8 1.2457 .1187 34 10.4080 
33 3324 1.2224 .1196 33 10.2179 
3^ 1306 1.2131 .1953 40 11.5169 
35 1 370 1.2129 .0912 57 13.3047 
36 4357 1.2119 . 0 633 80 19.1352 * 
37 41 78 1.2063 .0795 74 16.6237 it 
38 3285 1.2031 .1035 44 11.6232 
39 44 0 9 1.1932 . 1282 30 9.3074 
40 52 1 7 1.1921 .1048 4 1 11.3718 
41 2413 1.1854 .1559 22 7.60 52 
42 4398 1.1852 .114 3 3 7 10.3683 
43 37 8 9 1.1795 . 0 779 69 1 5.280 9 
44 4 1 9 3 1.17 53 n 7 O O '71 \ t; 0/1^0 * ^ 9 . -S . . 
45 2292 1 . 1 770 . 1 1 '70 3 5 o.9946 
46 12 9 9 ! . 1 7 7Zl . 0 935 5 3 12.5990 
47 1222 1.1611 .1178 36 9.8549 
4 8 6185 1.15-71 .1362 2 8 8.4^62 
A9 1367 1.1523 . 1044 42 11.0364 
50 4266 1.1350 . 0660 79 17.2016 
51 5265 1.1211 . 070 1 76 15.9908 
52 4383 1.1203 .1036 43 10.8132 
53 4277 1.1201 . 0443 96 25.3102 
54 5282 1 . 0879 .10 15 45 1 0.690 9 
55 4257 1 . 0 869 . 0628 81 17.3109 
56 423 0 1.0853 . 0522 89 20.8038 
57 427Z1 1.0651 .1109 39 9,6066 
58 5326 1.0633 . 0769 7 0 13.8343 
59 3226 1.0627 .0812 64 13.0947 
60 541 7 1.0512 . 0 995 48 10.5672 
61 2186 1.0430 .1575 20 6.6096 
62 4373 1 . 0399 . 0456 95 22.8184 
63 1334 1 . 0368 . 091 8 55 11.2997 
64 1243 1.0336 . 0 735 72 14.0620 
65 4348 1.0 216 . 0957 52 10.6737 
66 5249 1.0139 . 1 636 1 9 6.1993 
67 3236 1.0117 .0 925 54 10.9429 
68 51 80 1.0010 . 0 692 77 14.4693 
69 430 0 . 99 87 .0516 91 19.3532 
70 4244 . 9940 .0619 83 16.0659 
71 5307 . 9920 . 0 50 1 65 12.3866 
72 4247 . 9902 .0 91 6 56 1 0.80 81 
73 6360 . 9863 . 0595 84 16.5156 
74 431 9 . 9867 . 0690 78 1 4. 2980 
75 4270 . 9848 .0719 75 13.7006 
76 4381 .9839 . 0 835 61 1 1.7795 
77 4327 .9822 .10 1.3. . 46 9.6998 
78 5169 . 981 0 ’ . 0832 62 11.7899 
79 61 90 . 9792 .1001 47 9. 7781 
80 51 92 . 9726 . 0 457 94 21.2674 
81 4254 . 9514 .041 1 98 23.1364 
82 2323 . 950 6 . 1402 26 6.7793 
83 420 0 .9465 . 0983 50 9.6288 
84 520 7 . 9445 . 0790 67 11.9526 
85 430 3 . 9420 . 0 884 5 9 10.6558 
86 120 5 . 91 95 . 0987 49 9. 31 SO 
87 4275 . 90 92 . 0527 88 17.2404 
88 5224 . 8983 . 0 282 10 1 31.8959* 
89 6343 . 896 7 . 0586 85 15.3107 
90 61 76 . 8815 .0410 9 9 21.5007* 
91 4287 . 862 9 . 0465 93 18.5382* 
92 4447 .8583 . 0777 68 11.0415 
93 43 84 . 850 8 . 1243 31 6.8423 
94 6382 . 5485 . 0385 100 22. 0 620* 
95 6295 .8450 . 0 492 92 17.2317* 
96 640 0 . 8959 . 0628 82 13.1610* 
97 6333 . 822 1 . 0 43 7 97 1 8. 8318* 
98 526 1 .8180 . 0700 7 3 11.2155 
99 6199 .7636 . 05 82 56 1 3. 1 268* 
100 62 '^6 . 72 1 7 .0518 90 13.9374* 
1 0 1 6228 .7028 . 0529 87 13.2767* 
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relatively more volatile than the market in recent years. It 
is possible that this sample is biased toward more risky funds, 
but the large size and comprehensive nature of the sample makes 
this unlikely. 
Given Dual Fund leverage, and the tendency for leverage 
to increase as net assets decline in bear markets (see Figure 
2-3), it is not surprising that the range of betas for the 
Dual Fund capital shares is 4.76 to 1.87. A more realistic 
range for the Dual Fund betas is probably 2.84 to 1.87 because 
Fund 7300 (Hemisphere Fund) constitutes a "far-out" point 
which will be discussed later. 
The t-values of beta range from 31.9 to 5.1, indicating 
that all of the 101 betas, which will be used as risk proxies 
in the forthcoming risk-adjusted performance measure, are 
significantly greater than zero at the .01 level (t=2.8). An 
asterisk next to the t-value in Table 5-7 indicates that a 
fund's beta is significantly different from one at the .01 
level. Twenty-five of the high beta funds and ten of the low 
beta funds had risk levels which were statistically above or 
below the market portfolio's risk level of one. 
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TABLE 5-8 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS 
The Regression Coefficients (betas) For A Sample of 101 Funds, 
September 30, 1967 - December 31, 1973 
Median 
Regression 
Coefficient 
(beta) 
Std. Error 
of 
beta 
t-test of 
beta > 0 
1.14 .10 11.5 
Range 4.76-.70 
Interquartile Range 1.31-.99 
.45-.03 31.9-5.1 
.14-.07 15.4-9.71 
Risk-Adjusted Performance of 101 Funds 1967-1973 
For the period 1967 to 1973 a two point ex post security 
market line (SML) is estimated by a line connecting the quar¬ 
terly savings bank passbook rate (1.25%) with the S&P 500 In¬ 
dex mean quarterly return (1.09%). The two point SML and a 
plot of the 101 funds' mean returns and beta coefficients 
are shown in Figure 5-1. Funds plotting above the SML had returns 
above an equivalent risk market portfolio, whereas funds plot¬ 
ting below the SML had returns belov; an equivalent risk mar¬ 
ket portfolio. Deviations from the SML are calculated with 
equation (3i) and hereafter referred to as the J performance 
t 
score. 
It is important to recognize that the J score represents 
a performance measure which is used primarily because of its 
comparative investment appeal rather than a rigorous mathe¬ 
matical proof. Assuming the ability to borrow and lend at 
the risk-free rate, an investor could use leverage on a mar¬ 
ket portfolio to achieve a desired beta level. A 25% invest- 
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ment in a savings account and 75% investment in the S&P 500 
Index has a portfolio beta of 0.75, while betas greater than 
one could be achieved by leveraging the S&P 500 portfolio at 
the risk-free rate (a theoretical alternative at best). There¬ 
fore, a comparison of a mutual fund's average return with the 
market's benchmark has a great deal of logical appeal. How¬ 
ever, the rigorous nature of the comparison is suspect because 
of measurement errors in the surrogates for return and risk. 
For example, reference to column 2 of Table 5-7 reveals the 
standard error of the estiiriated beta coefficients. While the 
J performance score utilizes an absolute beta, beta is more 
accurately described by a confidence interval. 
It is clear from Figure 5-1 that the Wiesenberger classi¬ 
fications were good approximations of fund risk level with 
balanced and diversified funds (indicated by 5's and 6's) 
tending to cluster to the left of the beta scale, and growth 
funds (2's and I's) as well as Dual Funds (7's), tending to 
cluster at relatively high beta levels. 
The J performance scores for each fund are rank ordered 
in Table 5-9, along with their respective mean returns and 
betas. Twenty-nine funds had mean returns which were above 
the risk-adjusted market portfolio comparison (J>0), while 
seventy-two were below (J<0). 
In a relatively efficient market, the expectation would 
be that approximately half of the funds would do better than 
the market, and half would do worse. If fund management ex¬ 
penses were estimated at 0.25% per quarter and added back to mean 
TABLE 5-9 
SUMMARY OF 101 FUND PERFORMANCE STATISTICS OVER THE INTERVAL 
September 30, 1967 to December 31, 1973 
Fund J Mean Re- Rank 
Rank 
Code Score turn(R ) of R. 1 e__ of 3 
1 1 340 .9511 1; 9'17 6' 
< 
1 1.7437 13 
o 3285 .6 884 1.7428 2 1.2031 38 
,_3 1205 . 640 1 _ 1.7406 3 . 91 95 86 
51 92 . 5422 1.6341 4 . 9726 80 
5 4327 .4862 1 . 5765 5 . 9822 77 
6 740 0 . 4669 1.3599 1 1 2.1963 5 
7 6295 .4634 1.5755 6 . 8480 95 
8 720 0 . 441 2 1.3383 1 2 2.1711 6 
9 5282 .4233 1.4964 g 1.087? 54 
1 0 5224 .4013 1 . 50 53 7 . 8983 88 
1 1 4303 . 3745 1.4714 9 . 9420 85 
12 331 3 . 3596 1.3907 1 0 1.3467 23 
13 3789 .2575 1.3157 1 5 1.1795 43 
14 5326 . 24 99 -1.3271 14 1.0633 58 
1 5 1328 .2188 1.2663 1 8 1.2457 32 
16 6333 .2180 1.3343 1 3 . 8221 97 
17 1306 . 2005 1.2533 20 1.2131 34 
18 6360 . 1 862 1.2757 1 6 . 9868 73 
1 9 4381 .1815 1.2716 1 7 . 9839 76 
20 1 334 .1815 1.2630 1 9 1.0368 63 
21 2452 . 1523 1.1 126 23 1.7822 1 1 
22 4319 . 1440 1.2336 21 . 9867 74 : 
23 4398 .1197 1.1771 2 2 1.1852 42 
24 3294 .0 951 1.135! 2 5 1.2919 28 
25 4244 . 0736 1.1621 24 . 9940 70 
26 6228 . 0 359 1.1717 23 . 7028 101 
27 4270 . 0323 1 .1223 26 . 9848 75 
28 1299 .0165 1.0751 30 1 . 1774 46 
29 4287 . 0040 1.1138 27 . 8629 91 
30 43 84 -.0 n 98 1.1020 2 9 . 850 8 oc w 
31 4373 -.0214 1.0595 31 1 . 0399 62 
32 5265 -.0321 1 . 0356 34 1.1211 c; 1 * 
33 5180 -.0322 1.0551 3 2 1.0010 68 
34 41 93 -.0501 1.0084 35 1.1783 4 4 
35 5169 -.0524 1.0381 33 . 9810 7 8 
36 3324 -. 0 539 . 997 36 1.2224 3 3 
37 770 0 -. 0599 . 8854 41 1.8745 p w 
38 4357 -.0720 . 9810 38 1.211? 36 
39 640 0 -.1318 . 984 0 37 .825 9 96 
40 4383 -.1584 . 90 95 39 1.1203 5 2 
41 1 321 -.1651 . 8740 43 1.2977 27 
42 4254 -.2183 . 8771 42 .9514 81 
4 3 ^■26 1 -.2276 . 8895 4 0 . 81 80 C p 
4 4 5^ 1 7 -. 2370 .8-^1'^ 4 4 1 . 0 1 0 
45 7500 _ . 0 0 0 .6403 54 2.2178 4 . 
46 6276 - , 2 97 7 . 83 0 4 5 .7017 1 00 
47 6 34 3 -. 30 88 .7^55 46 . 8967 8? 
48 5 30 7 -.3235 . 7652 47 . 9970 7 1 i 
49 2292 -.3243 . 7342 50 1.1778 45 
50 4275 3399 . 7624 48 . 9092 87 
51 1372 -.3514 . 70 1 5 52 1.2129 
52 430 0 -.3581 . 7296 51 . 9987 69 
53 6176 -. 3687 .7380 49 . 8815 90 
54 4277 -.3919 . 6760 53 1.1201 53 
55 520 7 -. 4605 . 6359 55 . 9445 84 
56 2186 -.4665 .6140 57 1 . 0430 61 
57 6382 -.4830 .6291 56 . 8485 94 
58 4274 -.4846 . 5922 58 1.0651 57 
•5 9 241 3 -.5180 . 5393 59 1.1854 41 
60 1291 -.5226 .5114 62 1.3286 25 
61 3223 -.5284 . 51 27 61 1.2852 29 
62 4247 -.5596 .5295 60 . 9902 72 
63 2345 -.5618 .4401 6 6 1.5260 17 
64 760 0 -.564 5 .3194 68 2.2522 3 
65 1 367 -.5872 . 4754 64 1 . 1 523 49 
66 61 90 -.6314 . 4595 65 . 97 92 79 
67 6199 -.6430 .4829 63 . 7636 o o y y 
68 1278 -.7067 . 3307 67 1 . 30 80 26 
69 4344 - ^.742 8 . .3017 70 . 1.2641 3 1 
70 1 222 -. 74 80 .3133 69 1.1611 47 
71 4230 -.8023 .2713 71 1.0853 56 
72 2342 -.81 32 . 200 6 76 1.4535 19 
73 3236 -.8305 .2551 73 1.0117 67 
74 444 7 -. 85 0 4 .2600 72 . 8583 92 
75 61 85 -.8530 .2089 74 1.1571 48 
76 2203 -.8552 . 0970 82 1.8324 1 0 
77 5249 -.8531 . 2020 75 1.0139 66 
78 521 7 -.9088 . 1 474 78 1.1921 40 
79 420 0 -. 91 94 . 1768 77 . 9465 83 
80 4178 - . 95 0 7 .1032 50 1.2063 37 
81 4266 -.9529 . 1 1 26 7 9 1.1350 50 
82 320 8 -.9533 . 0580 83 1.2535 30 
83 3226 -.9782 . 0 990 81 1 . 0627 59 
84 23 2 3 - 1 . 030 0 . 0655 54 . 9506 82 
85 1283 -1.1130 -.0818 86 1.3464 24 
86 1 24 3 -1.1477 -.0657 85 1.0336 64 
87 241 7 - 1 . 17 67 -.2109 89 1.7484 12 
88 1289 -1 . 1880 - .2367 90 1.8377 o 
89 4257 -1.2240 -.1506 57 1 . 0 86 9 55 
90 710 0 - 1.23 9 8 -.4512 93 2.8387 o 
91 4348 -1.2861 -.2022 88 1.0216 65 
92 '>'X'7 Q. -1 . 3685 -.3853 91 1.6409 14 
93 220 1 -1.3867 -. 4003 92 1.6218 16 
94' 2242 -1.7764 -.7901 94 1.6220 1 5 
95 1 198 -1.8262 -.8092 95 1.4333 20 
96 1 1 82 -2.2068 -1.1856 96 1.4077 22 
97 217 9 -2. 50 97 -1.4888 9 8 1.4096 21 
98 440 9 -2. 52 4 0 -1.4679 97 1 . 1 932 39 
99 739 0 -3.2622 -2.7854 10 0 . '^570 1 
100 237 -3.4167 -2.4912 9 9 1.9961 7 
1 0 1 2168 -4. 1 54 8 -3.1495 1 0 1 1.5059 1 
89 
fund returns, forty-five out of the 101 fund sample did better 
than the benchmark, and fifty-six did worse. 
The highest J score was +0.95, and the lowest score was 
-4.15. The Dual Fund J scores (series 7000) appear to be 
well-distributed among the sample, ranking 6, 8, 37, 45, 64, 
90, and 99. The risk-adjusted performance score ranking of 
the Dual Funds shows considerable improvement from their rank¬ 
ings of returns before risk-adjustment (Table 5-1). This is 
partly due to the negatively sloping SML where the expectation 
is that the mean quarterly return on a leveraged market port¬ 
folio declines .16% as beta increases from 1.0 to 2.0. 
To test the empirical validity of the two point ex post 
SML, individual fund returns (column 2, Table 5-9) were re¬ 
gressed on their respective beta coefficients (column 3). 
Table 5-10 contains a summary of the differences between an 
empirical risk/return trade off line and the two-point SML. 
TABLE 5-10 
ESTIMATES OF THE SECURITY MARKET LINE 
September 30, 1967 - December 31, 1973 
Empirical Cross Section 
Regression Results_ 
Slope 
Inter- Coeffi- 2 
cept cient r r test' 
Two-Point Ex post SML 
Risk-Free Slope 
Rate or coeff_icient 
Intercept (R^-R^^) 
1.59 -.84 -.48 .23 29.5 
(t=-5.4) 
1.25 -.16 
A relatively low r value .23) was obtained in the em- 
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pirical cross section regression of returns on their respec¬ 
tive beta coefficients. However, the F-test value of 29.5 
indicates that the regression results are statistically sig¬ 
nificant at the .01 level. The slope coefficient of -.84 is 
considerably less than the two point SML slope coefficient of 
-.16. This means that high risk (high beta) funds tended to 
have returns which were below those predicted by the SML, 
whereas low risk funds tended to have returns above the pre¬ 
dicted level. This interpretation is supported by the inter¬ 
cept term of the empirical regressions which was 1.59 as com¬ 
pared to the 1.25 risk-free SML intercept. The cross section 
regression shows that risk-adjusted performance tended to de¬ 
teriorate as the risk level of the funds increased. 
To test this result further, the empirical cross section 
regression was rerun omitting the three funds which had the 
lowest mean returns during the period 1967 to 1973. These 
three funds had negative mean returns ranging from 2.49 to 3.15 
quarterly, and as such, represent "far out" points in Figure 
5-1. This second cross section regression of ninety-eight 
funds yielded a slope coefficient of -.51 (t = -2.79) and an 
intercept of 1.25. In other words, even after eliminating 
the most extreme observations, high risk funds tend to have 
returns below those predicted by the two point SML. 
Black-Jensen-Scholes [10] obtained similar results in 
a study of all NYSE stocks grouped into ten portfolios accord¬ 
ing to risk level. For 35 years from 1931 to 1965, a cross 
92 
section regression of the ten portfolio returns on their betas 
yielded a statistically higher intercept term and a signifi¬ 
cantly lower slope coefficient than estimated by the capital 
asset pricing model. 
McEnally [105] also found that the highest of five risk 
categories of stocks yielded mean returns below the two pre¬ 
ceding lower risk categories from 1945 to 1965. In addition, 
he found that the skewness of returns took a large jump in the 
highest risk category. Kraus and Litzenberger [85] refine the 
concept of skewness to include systematic skewness, and con¬ 
clude "The magnitude of the intercept and the slopes from a 
regression of ex post mean excess returns on beta and gamma 
(systematic skewness) are consistent with a three moment val¬ 
uation model with unrestricted borrowing at the pure interest 
rate. 
A full explanation of apparent investor preference for 
positive systematic skewness is based on the hypothesis that 
investors are willing to trade off some expected return for 
the chance to "strike it rich". In addition, tax laws pro¬ 
vide favored treatment for capital gains relative to ordinary 
income received on the risk-free asset or low risk-high divi¬ 
dend yielding common stocks. 
Brealey [20] suggests a large class of investors who 
seek high returns by tolerating a high degree of risk. Tech¬ 
nically, they could obtain high return-high risk portfolios 
by either leverage or by buying risky stocks. As a practical 
93 
matter, many investors cannot borrow to buy stocks because 
of commercial bank loan restrictions. In addition, broker¬ 
age houses will not accept margin accounts with less than 
$2,000 of equity and charge higher rates of interest on loans 
under $35,000. Many high-risk investors thus have no alter¬ 
native to achieving their- goals than buying risky stocks. As 
Brealey puts it, this competition for the ownership of risky 
assets, as a substitute for leverage, leads to the over-pric¬ 
ing (and subsequent lower returns) of high-risk stocks. 
Lower long-run returns for risky stocks could explain why 
mutual funds which held risky stocks experienced low risk- 
adjusted returns from 1967 to 1973. It is noteworthy, how¬ 
ever, that Dual Funds achieve high risk levels by leverage, 
g 
rather than holding risky stocks. It remains to be seen 
whether leveraged Dual Funds also experienced low risk-ad¬ 
justed returns. 
The Jonckheere Test of Cross Sectional Performance by Risk Level 
Table 5-11 contains the relevant performance statistics 
for the 101 funds grouped according to seven surrogate risk 
level categories as provided by the Wiesenberger classifica¬ 
tions . 
The Jonckheere Test [76] uses the rank orders of the J 
performance scores to determine whether the rankings of the 
101 funds are randomly distributed, or whether there is a pre¬ 
dictable rank order. The cross section regression of returns 
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on betas provides the basis for the alternative hypothesis 
that the risk-adjusted performance of mutual funds from 1967 
to 1973 was inversely related to risk level. 
To obtain broad risk categories and for computational 
convenience, the seven categories are compressed into four. 
The Maximal Capital Gains category is combined with Large 
Growth Funds for a composite growth fund sample of thirty-one 
funds (Group III); the Long Term Growth of Capital and Income 
Group is combined with the Diversified Common Stocks A group 
to represent a sample of thirty-eight diversified funds with 
average volatility (Group II); the Diversified Common Stocks 
B group is combined with Balanced Funds in a sample of twenty- 
five representing conservative, less volatile mutual funds 
(Group I). The sample of seven Dual Funds stands alone 
(Group IV). 
The Jonckheere Test tests a null hypothesis of random¬ 
ness in the performance orderings against an alternative hy¬ 
pothesis which specifies that on average ranks will be in¬ 
versely related to risk level. Specifically, one alternative 
hypothesis is that the rankings will be distributed so that, 
on average, rankings of Group I > Group II > Group III > 
Group IV. 
Table 5-12 contains a summary of the results of the 
Jonckheere Test using three different alternative hypotheses. 
96 
TABLE 5-12 
THE JONCKHEERE TEST OF CROSS SECTIONAL PERFORMANCE 
BY RISK LEVEL 1967-1973 
Hq : Random Rankings 
: Rankings Inversely Related to Risk Level 
Ph “*5 Ph 
Predicted Group p p ^ _ A 0 
Rankings for VAR.H^ ^ VAR.H^ 
Group I > II > III 1452 143.3 1875 2.95* 
Group I > II > III > IV 1781 161.6 2196 2.56* 
Group IV > I > II > III 1781 161.6 2212 2.67* 
* Value statistically significant at .01 level; 
therefore, reject 
The first Jonckheere Test in row 1, Table 5-12 shows 
that the of randomness of rankings of ninety-four funds 
versus an of rankings of Group I > II > III is rejected 
at the .01 level. The first test omits the seven Dual Funds 
and shows that there is a high probability that the perform¬ 
ance rankings of the ninety-four mutual funds was inversely 
related to risk level. 
In Row 2, Table 5-12 the Dual Funds are included with 
a predicted ranking of Group I > II > III > IV. Again the 
Z value obtained indicated that can be rejected at the .01 
level. Row 3, on the other hand, contains an of Group 
I > II > III, but includes the Dual Funds as the top ranking 
category, i.e.. Group IV > I > II > III. The Z value obtained 
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for the last test also indicates rejection of at the .01 
level. 
Rejection of occurs whether the Dual Funds are hypoth¬ 
esized to rank first or last, the Z value being neglibly high¬ 
er when the of Duals first is used. 
The Jonckheere test indicates that fund performance from 
1967 to 1973 deteriorated as risk level increased and sup¬ 
ports the earlier results of the enpirical regression of re¬ 
turn on risk. However, the test is inconclusive as to the 
relative performance of the Dual Funds. This is probably due 
to the small population size of Dual Funds relative to the 
other sample groups. One would expect to reject a large num¬ 
ber of contradictory hypotheses using standard statistical 
tests when the Dual Fund population is so small, hence it is 
necessary to develop an alternative comparative approach. 
A Test of Dual Fund Performance Versus Random Mutual Funds 
A test of Dual Fund performance which will not be affec¬ 
ted by small sample size is required. The Mann-Whitney U 
Test is used to compare the risk-adjusted performance ranks 
of the seven Dual Funds to the ranks of ten non-over-lapping 
groups of seven other mutual funds from the ninety-four fund 
sample. The ten groups were selected from a table of random 
numbers. 
The Mann-Whitney U Test takes account of the number of 
times the rank of each Dual Fund is preceded by the rank of 
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the fund from one of the random groups, or vice versa. The 
null hypothesis is that the performance rankings of Dual 
Funds and a given random group do not differ significantly. 
The alternative hypothesis is that the rankings of a given 
random group are greater than the Dual Fund rankings. 
The Mann-Whitney is run ten separate times, pairing the 
Dual Funds against Random Groups 1 to 10, respectively (see 
Table 5-13). Tables of U values with associated probabili¬ 
ties of accepting with n = 7 are available in Siegel [138]. 
In six out of the ten tests, the U value obtained indicates 
that the probability of the null hypothesis being true is 
99%. In two of the tests, cannot be rejected at the .69 
level when Random Groups #6 and #7 are compared to the Dual 
Funds. In tests #8 cind #9, the probability of is .32 and 
.80 respectively, but any superiority of rankings belongs to 
the Dual Group. 
The Mann-Whitney U Tests compared the rankings of Dual 
Funds and random groups of mutual funds, and implies that 
Dual Fund rankings are randomly distributed in the total sam¬ 
ple of 101 Funds. The Jonckheere test indicates that mutual 
funds which attain high beta levels by buying and holding 
risky (high beta) securities had relatively inferior risk- 
adjusted performance in the ninety-four fund sample. On the 
other hand, the Mann-Whitney test seems to indicate that 
f^jnds which used leverage to attain high beta portfolios had 
risk-adjusted performance which is neither inferior nor super- 
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TABLE 5-13 
PERFORMANCE RANKS OF SEVEN DUAL FUNDS 
COMPARED TO RANKS OF RANDOM PORTFOLIOS 
Possible Funds Ranks = 1 to 101 
Dual 
Funds 
Random 
Group 
1 
Random 
Group 
2 
Random 
Group 
3 
Random 
Group 
4 
Random 
Group 
5 
Ranks 6 10 4 19 11 17 
8 73 15 32 18 27 
37 12 23 35 33 29 
45 66 42 46 54 39 
64 31 61 59 74 49 
90 85 94 69 79 91 
99 63 100 98 80 95 
U-Value of Rankings 
of Random VS. Duals 25* 24* 25* 25* 25* 
- 
Random 
Group 
6 
Random 
Group 
7 
Random 
Group 
8 
Random 
Group 
9 
Random 
Gro up 
10 
Ranks 16 3 43 14 5 
20 13 53 26 28 
24 36 62 30 55 
25 38 67 70 57 
40 47 68 77 75 
52 60 88 81 86 
82 65 97 92 87 
U-Value 20** 20** 32*** 2 7*** 25* 
* Probability of of equality = .99 
** Probability of H of equality = .62 
*** For Random Groups 8 and 9, the probability of 
is .32 and .80 respectively, however, any super¬ 
iority of rankings belongs to the Dual Funds. 
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ior to the sample as a whole. 
A Test of Dual Fund Performance Versus an Alternative 
Leveraging Strategy 
The results of studies by Black-Jensen-Scholes [10], 
McEnally [105], and Kraus and Litzenberger [85], as well as 
the results of this study, indicate that investing in port¬ 
folios with high asset betas does not lead to the payoff ex¬ 
pected by the capital asset pricing model. In addition, the 
Tobin-Sharpe version of the capital asset pricing model 
strongly suggests that high risk portfolios should be ob¬ 
tained by using leverage. 
Existing Dual Fund portfolio betas before leverage (i. 
e., asset betas) range from .81 to 1.26. Dual Fund asset 
betas fall roughly in a moderate beta range. However, the 
postulates of elementary corporate finance state that firms 
with high financial risk should be wary of adding operations 
with high degrees of operating risk. From a portfolio stand¬ 
point, corporate finance theory implies that an appropriate 
investment strategy would be to leverage a low beta port¬ 
folio. The purpose of this section is to test a hypothesis 
that leveraged low beta portfolios yield greater risk-ad¬ 
justed returns than leveraged moderate beta portfolios. 
To test this strategy, the seven mutual funds with the 
lowest betas in the sample of 101 were artifically set up as 
Dual Funds as of September 30, 1967. The seven artificial 
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Dual Funds began with 2:1 leverage and any capital gains paid 
by the original funds were reinvested at the end of the quar¬ 
ter paid. Income shares of these artificial Dual Funds were 
paid a minimum cumulative dividend of 6% of original income 
share par value. 
Table 5-14 presents the seven funds chosen with appropri¬ 
ate statistical comparison to the "real" Dual Funds. The 
betas for the artificial funds before leverage ranged from 
.70 to .85, while the real Dual Fund portfolios with leverage 
removed had betas ranging from .81 to 1.26. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used to compare the cumu¬ 
lative frequency distribution of the J scores of the two sets 
of Dual Funds. The null hypothesis is that there is no dif¬ 
ference in the J scores of the two sets. The alternative is 
that the cumulative frequency distribution of performance 
score for the artificial Duals dominates the corresponding 
distribution for the actual Duals. Both sets of Dual Fund 
returns and betas are plotted in relation to the two point 
SML in Figure 5-3. 
The frequency distribution of the two sets of J scores 
were compared using an ordered interval scale of 0.25. The 
range for artificial Dual Fund J's was -1.68 to +0.45 and the 
range of the real Dual Fund J's was -3.26 to +0.47. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test focuses on the largest difference in 
the two curves of the cumulative frequency distributions. 
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TABLE 5-14 
COMPARISON OF SEVEN "LEVERAGED" LOW BETA MUTUAL 
FUNDS WITH THE SEVEN DUAL FUNDS 
Original Original 2:1 2:1 
Un- Un- Lever- Lever- 
leveraged leveraged aged aged 
Code Artificial Dual Funds Beta** J Score Beta** J Score 
Channing Balanced .76 -.64 1.69 -1.68 
A2 Dodge & Cox Balanced .83 -.13 1.78 -0.44 
Eaton & Howard Balanced .70 + .04 1.60 -0.40 
Group Life Securities (now 
U.S. Life Common Stock Fund) .82 -.23 1. 80 -0.80 
Investors Mutual .72 -.30 1.60 +0.45 
-6 
G. Putnam F\ind . 82 + .22 1. 76 +0.40 
^7 
Lommis-Sayles Mutual . 85 + .46 1.85 -0.97 
Actual Dual Funds 
American 1.08* 2.84 -1.24 
Gemini 1.26* 2.17 +0.44 
Hemisphere .91* 4.76 -3. 26 
Income & Capital 1.18* 2.20 +0.47 
Leverage Fd. of Boston 1.03* 2.22 -0.25 
Putnam Duofund .81* 2.25 -0.56 
^7 
Scudder .90* 1.87 -0.06 
* Reflects beta of fund's total assets return, with 
leverage removed. 
** All betas significant at the .01 level. 
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The largest deviation between the two frequency distri¬ 
butions is 1/7 or .15. The smaller the deviation, the 
greater the probability of the null hypothesis. A maximum 
deviation of .15 is too small to be included in a table of 
7 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov rejection values. This indicates that 
it is not possible to reject a null hypothesis of no signifi¬ 
cant difference in the performance of the artificial and real 
Dual Funds. The proposition that Dual Funds could have 
achieved higher risk-adjusted returns by holding lower beta 
portfolios is not supported by a hypothetical strategy of 
leveraging low beta mutual funds from 1967 to 1973. 
A Test of Dual Fund Capital Share Performance Versus 
Their Respective Unleveraged Total Portfolios 
The risk-adjusted performance of the Dual Fund's capital 
shares is compared to the risk-adjusted performance of their 
respective total assets using the Wilcoxon Matched Pairs 
Signed-Ranks Test. Measuring total asset portfolio returns 
amounts to "undoing" the leverage and measuring returns of 
Dual Funds as if they were not divided into capital and in¬ 
come share returns. 
•In reality, investors could undo the leverage by buying 
an equal amount of both capital and income shares. To fund 
managers such behavior might seem schizophrenic since the 
funds were dichotomized in order to meet the needs of two 
supposedly opposing classes of investors. However, a number 
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of investors have bought both classes of shares as indicated 
by a sentence in the cover letter to the 1974 Scudder Duo-Vest 
proxy statement, "If you held both Income Shares and Capital 
Shares on the record date, two proxy cards are enclosed, one 
for each class of stock." 
Such investor behavior gives rise to the hypothesis that 
investors would have experienced superior investment perform¬ 
ance by "undoing" the leverage or holding an equal number of 
both capital and income shares rather than holding only cap¬ 
ital shares. The null hypothesis is that there is no signifi¬ 
cant difference in the risk-adjusted returns from holding only 
capital shares, or from holding an equal number of capital 
and income shares. Table 5-15 contains a statistical compari¬ 
son of Dual Fund capital shares with their respective total 
asset portfolios. 
The procedures and power of the Wilcoxon Matched pairs 
test were discussed in Chapter IV. The test takes account of 
the differences in the matched J scores and the relative mag¬ 
nitude of the differences. Both sets of returns and betas are 
shown in Figure 5-5. 
Four of the Dual Fund capital share J scores are greater 
than their respective total asset J scores; three total asset 
J scores are greater than capital share J scores. However, 
the relative magnitude of any superiority is not great enough 
to reject a null hypothesis of no significant difference in 
the two sets of performance scores. In fact, there is more 
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than a 50% probability that the null hypothesis of no differ- 
• ^ 8 ence is true. 
On this basis, it appears that Dual Funds' capital share¬ 
holders would not have experienced better investment perform¬ 
ance by buying an offsetting number of income shares. 
TABLE 5-15 
COMPARISON OF DUAL FUND CAPITAL SHARES 
WITH RESPECTIVE TOTAL ASSETS, 
September 30, 1967 - December 31, 1973 
Capital Shares Total Assets 
No. Fund % Mean 
Quarterly 
Return 
Beta* J 
Score 
% Mean Beta* 
Quarterly 
Return 
J 
Score 
1 American -0.45 2.84 -1.24 0.03 1.08 -1.04 
2 Gemini +1.33 2.17 +0.44 0.95 1.26 -0.09 
3 Hemisphere -2.79 4.76 -3.26 -1.38 .91 -2.48 
4 Income & 
Capital +1.36 2.20 +0.47 +1.23 1.18 +0.17 
5 Leverage Fd. 
of Boston +0.64 2.22 -0.25 +0.67 1.03 -0.41 
6 Putnam +0.32 2.25 -0.56 +0.52 .81 -0.60 
7 Scudder + 0.89 1.87 -0.06 +1.06 .90 -0.05 
* All betas significant at the .01 level. 
A Test of Dual Fund Capital Share- Net Asset Values 
Compared to Their Respective Market Prices 
Recall that the make-up of Dual Fund capital shares is 
such that investor returns at maturity will reflect net asset 
value returns. This supports a null hypothesis that there is 
no difference in the performance statistics of capital share 
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market prices and their respective underlying net asset val¬ 
ues. An alternative hypothesis is suggested by the fact that 
Dual Fund capital shares have sold at discounts to net asset 
value for most of their existence. Specifically, the alterna¬ 
tive hypothesis is that market price returns were lower than 
net asset value returns. 
Table 5-16 contains the return and risk statistics for 
both market prices and net asset values of Dual Fund capital 
shares. 
TABLE S-de 
COMPARISON OF DUAL FUND CAPITAL SHARE NET ASSET 
VALUES WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE MARKET PRICES 
September 30, 1967 - December 31, 1973 
Capital Share Capital Share 
Net Asset Values Market Prices 
No. Fund % Mean . 
Quarterly 
Return 
Beta* J 
Score 
% Mean 
Quarterly 
Return 
Beta* J 
Score 
1 American -0.45 2.84 -1.24 -1.88 1.96 -2.81 
2 Gemini +1.33 2.17 + 0.44 +0.76 1.93 -0.17 
3 Hemisphere -2.79 4.76 -3.26 -6.34 2.25 -7.23 
4 Income & 
Capital +1.36 2.20 +0.47 -0.45 1.94 -1.38 
5 Leverage Fd. 
of Boston +0.64 2.22 -0.25 -0.85 1.68 -1.83 
6 Putnam +0.32 2.25 -0.56 -2.61 1.20 -3.67 
7 Scudder +0.89 1.87 -0.06 -0.54 1.45 -1.55 
* All betas significant at the .01 level. 
C
O
M
PA
R
IS
O
N
 
O
F 
T
H
E
 
PE
R
FO
R
M
A
N
C
E
 O
F 
D
U
A
L 
FU
N
D
 C
A
R
T
A
L
 S
H
A
R
E
 
N
E
T
 
A
SS
E
T
 V
A
LU
ES
 
A
N
D
 
M
A
R
K
ET
 
PR
IC
E
S 
Ill 
The comparison is striking; in each of the seven cases, 
the mean quarterly return, the beta coefficient, and the J 
score of the market prices is less than the corresponding 
statistic for capital share net asset values. The means and 
returns are plotted in relation to the two point SML in Figure 
5-6. 
The Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Signed-Ranks Test is used to 
test the null hypothesis that there is no significant differ¬ 
ence between performance statistics of Dual Fund capital share 
net asset values and market prices. For mean return, beta, 
and J score, the obtained test statistic of 0 is sufficient 
to reject the null hypothesis of equality at the .01 level. 
Inasmuch as the power efficiency of the Wilcoxon test is 
estimated at 95% of that of a t-test when the data can be an¬ 
alyzed by both types of tests, it seems fair to conclude that 
the effect of the discount has been to reduce realized returns 
for holders of Dual Fund capital shares, whether m.easured with 
or without risk-adjustment. In addition, the market has low¬ 
ered the volatility or beta coefficient of each fund, thus 
offsetting net asset value fluctuations with countering dis¬ 
counts and premiums. 
It is interesting to note the performance of Putnam Duo- 
fund in the market. This fund was the smallest of the Dual 
Funds when it started (1967 total assets $28 million compared 
to Scudder Duo-Vest's assets of $100 million), and is the only 
Dual Fund that trades over-the-counter rather than on the New 
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York Stock Exchange. Putnam may have suffered because of 
lack of sponsorship, size, or an anti-OTC bias, but in any 
case its mean market price return was -2.61% per quarter as 
compared to a net asset value mean return of +0.32% per 
quarter. The beta of the market price of Putnam was 1.20 
compared to a beta for the fund of 2.25. In other words, 
the market has reduced the volatility of the leveraged Dual 
Fund well within a 95% confidence interval of the median 101 
fund sample beta of 1.14. 
Summary of Performance Results 
The following is a brief summary of the study measuring 
the risk-adjusted quarterly performance of seven Dual Funds 
and ninety-four other mutual funds from 1967 to 1973. 
(1) The returns of the sample of 101 funds were highly cor¬ 
related with the S&P 500 Composite Index. In all cases, 
regression statistics were statistically significant 
with the exception of the intercept term. 
(2) When mean quarterly returns for the 101 funds were re¬ 
gressed on their respective beta coefficients, the re¬ 
sult was a statistically significant negative linear 
relationship between realized returns and systematic 
risk from 1967 to 1973. This relationship was predicted 
by a two“point ex post SML for the same period, but the 
cross section results indicate that even after risk-adjust 
ment, fund performance v/as inversely related to risk level 
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during that interval. 
(3) A Jonckheere test of risk-adjusted performance rankings 
of four different risk categories of funds supports the 
results of the cross section regression in (2) above. 
More conservative mutual funds ranked higher than might 
be expected if all fund ranks were randomly distributed 
whereas higher risk funds ranked lower. 
(4) There appeared to be no significant difference between 
the risk-adjusted performance of leveraged Dual Funds 
and ten random samples of funds from the mutual fund 
sample of ninety-four during the interval. 
(5) There is no indication that fund managers could have sig 
nificantly improved the risk-adjusted performance of 
their leveraged Dual Fund portfolios by holding lower 
beta assets. 
(6) While there appeared to be no significant difference in 
the risk-adjusted performance of Dual Fund capital 
shares and their respective total asset portfolios (i.e. 
leverage removed), the performance statistics of Dual 
Fund market prices were significantly different from 
their net asset values. Market price mean returns, 
betas, and risk-adjusted returns were lower than their 
respective net asset value statistics. The lower re¬ 
turn statistics reflect persistent discounts relative to 
net asset value in the market place. The discounting 
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process had a particularly severe impact on the returns 
realized by investors who held the only Dual Fund which 
trades over-the-counter. 
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Footnotes 
Descriptive statistics involving the mean are heavily 
influenced by "outlier" funds. In the discussion which follows, 
the median appears to provide a less biased measure of central 
tendency. 
2 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Institutional In- 
vestor Study, v.2, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office) 1971, p. 335. 
3 
Jensen"s [72] regression of 115 funds' annual returns 
on their betas, 1955-1964, yielded a lower coefficient of de¬ 
termination of .09. 
^An empirical regression was also run on the 101 fund 
returns and their respective standard deviations, or the 
total risk proxy. The results were: intercept=l.60, slope 
coef f icients=-0.10 (t-value 5.79), r=-.5, r'^=.25, F-value 
=33.6. Given the negative SML, the expectation is that the 
relationship between returns and standard deviations is in¬ 
verse. If negative values of the slope coefficient and r 
were not obtained, there would be evidence that large stan¬ 
dard deviations were "blowing-up" and biasing upward the re¬ 
turns of high-risk funds. 
5 
A. Kraus and R.H. Litzenberger, "Skewness Preference 
and the Valuation of Risky Assets," Unpublished paper, Stan¬ 
ford University Graduate School of Business, 1972, p. 18. 
g 
This assumes, of course, that Dual Funds do not combine 
both leverage and speculative stocks in the portfolio. 
7 
F.J. Massey, Jr., "The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of Good¬ 
ness of Fit," Journal of American Statistical Association 46: 
253, (March 1951), p. 70. 
p 
M. Hollander and D.A. Wolfe, Nonparametrical Statisti- 
cal Methods, (New York: John Wiley & Sons), 1973, p. 28; 269. 
CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS OF THE DISCOUNT AND APPRAISAL 
OF DUAL FUNDS' CAPITAL SHARES 
Past Attempts to Account for the Discount 
Some observers thought that Dual Funds would sell as a 
premium over net asset value. By the end of 1967, however, 
all seven Dual Fund capital shares' market prices were at a 
discount to net asset value, and with few exceptions, the dis¬ 
counts have continued through mid-1974. 
The Wall Street Journal recently ascribed Dual Fund dis¬ 
counts to wide-spread investor apathy, but this explanation 
does not explain why discounts also occurred during periods 
of investor enthusiasm in the late 1960's. 
The investment editor of Fortune provided the following 
explanation: 
"In retrospect, it appears that one reason for these 
heavy discounts on the capital shares is the lever¬ 
age that was originally supposed to make the shares 
so attractive .... John Shelton, a professor of 
finance at the University of California at Los Angeles, 
has argued that this kind of risk requires investors 
to seek a higher rate of return. In discounting the 
prices^ the stock market makes possible such a re¬ 
turn. rd 
This explanation has some appeal. However, it fails to 
explain why Hemisphere Fund, the worst performing of the 
seven Dual Funds, is the one fund which has sold at a premium 
rather than a discount. 
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A number of brokers have indicated that the discount is 
related to poor investment performance. Such an explanation 
is not consistent with the results reported in Chapter V, 
where the performance of Dual Fund capital share net asset 
values was not significantly different from random samples of 
ninety-four mutual funds. 
In any case, the discount does reflect lack of investor 
demand for capital shares. A more complete explanation of 
Dual Fund discounts may lie in some combination of institu¬ 
tional barriers to information and investor reactions to the 
leverage feature. 
Institutional Barriers 
Dual Funds are more difficult for the investing public 
to understand than conventional mutual funds. The inverse 
relationship of the leverage factor to changes in net asset 
value, and the difference between leverage before and after 
the discount, are particularly difficult for a broker to ex¬ 
plain over the telephone. It is much easier for the broker 
to sell an interested investor a conventional mutual fund. 
Besides, the commission rate on an investment in a "load" 
mutual fund may be as high as 8-1/2% of the total investment, 
whereas the commission on a Dual Fund purchased on the NYSE 
might be as little as 2% - 3%, depending on the amount pur¬ 
chased. 
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Because of their small size relative to other mutual 
funds, a large part of the investing public probably remains 
ignorant of Dual Funds. Institutional investors, on the other 
hand, usually do not buy funds managed by other institutional 
investors. The result is that the market prices of Dual Fund 
capital shares remain at a discount and trading volume is 
usually very light. 
Finally, it must be added that potential returns from in¬ 
vesting in common stocks and mutual funds were oversold by 
zealous brokers in the late 1960's. The idea that mutual funds 
could consistantly achieve above average rates of return, 
after adjustment for risk, is not consistent with the findings 
of this study, or the results of any past research on mutual 
funds. Public disenchantment with realized returns from mu¬ 
tual fund investments is reflected in persistent net mutual 
fund redemptions in the past three years. 
Investor Expectations and Reactions to the Leverage Factor 
Closed-end investment company shares have sold at dis¬ 
count and premiums since the 1920's. Considerable research 
has been undertaken in order to account for periodic discounts 
and premiums on closed-end funds. The general consensus of 
this research is that closed-end discounts (premiums) are re¬ 
lated to investor expectations of future portfolio returns, 
discounted at a competitive rate. A full explanation of Dual 
Fund discounts is likely to rest on similar grounds. 
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For Dual Funds, the keys to expectations are the lever¬ 
age factor and estimates of future equity values. The nomi¬ 
nal leverage factor for a Dual Fund is inversely related to 
changes in the total portfolio's asset values (see Figure 
6-1). In other words, as total assets increase, the nominal 
leverage factor declines for the capital shareholder; as total 
assets decline, the leverage factor increases. 
From the point of view of the capital shareholder, effec¬ 
tive leverage is determined by nominal leverage times dis¬ 
count or premium (equation 2c). A discount from net asset 
values enhances the nominal leverage and a premium reduces 
nominal leverage. Graphically, the potential effect of the 
discount and premium on the nominal leverage curve is shown 
in Figure 6-1, 
When total portfolio assets of one $10 capital share and 
one $10 income share increase from an initial $20 to $30, the 
nominal leverage declines. If, however, the capital shares are discounted, 
the leverage factor increases. For example, a discount of 25% 
at $30 would return the fund to its original 2:1 leverage 
ratio. 
Conversely, the nominal leverage factor rises to 3:1 as 
total assets decline from $20 to $15. If the capital shares 
commanded a premium above the $15 net asset value in the 
market, increases in nominal leverage would be offset to 
some extent. 
To summarize, in the absence of any discount or premium, 
nominal leverage declines as total assets increase and nom- 
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inal leverage increases as total assets decline. 
TABLE 6-1 
QUARTERLY ASSET VALUE RANGES AND DISCOUNTS 
(PREMIUMS) FOR DUAL FUND CAPITAL SHARES, 1967-1973 
Discount 
Net Asset Market (Premium) 
Value Range Price Range Range 
American $20.76- $ 4.69 $19.25- $4.62 -29.5 to +43.9 
Gemini 22.15- 11.25 17.62- 7.87 -33.4 to + 0.7 
Hemisphere 13.33- 0.77 12.50- 1.37 -24.0 to + 835 
Income & 
Cap. 
Shares 17.53- 7.99 17.00- 6.37 -37.9 to + 9.3 
Leverage 
Fd. of 
Boston 18.26- 8.02 14.00- 7.00 -35.8 to +1.2 
Putnam 12.99- 3.16 11.00- 4.00 -41.7 to + 38.2 
Scudder 12.25- 5.12 8.50- 4.87 -35.8 to -4.8 
In nearly seven years of operation, total asset values 
for six out of the seven Dual Funds have fluctuated roughly 
in the boxed-in range of Figure 6-1. Since total asset changes 
have remained in a linear segment of the leverage curve, piece- 
wise linear regression can be used to test the strength of 
the inverse leverage ratio relationship to total asset changes. 
The size of the coefficient of determination in the time 
series regression of the nominal leverage ratio on total 
assets for twenty-five consecutive quarters from 1967 to 1973 
indicates the predicted strength of the relationship of lever- 
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2 
age to total asset changes. If significantly lower r 's are 
obtained from the time series regression of effective lever¬ 
age ratios on total assets, there would be evidence that 
changes in total assets are less important in explaining changes 
in effective leverage than nominal leverage. In other words, 
some other variable(s) are responsible for changes in the 
leverage ratio. 
TABLE 6-2 
CORRELATION OF LEVERAGE RATIO AND TOTAL ASSETS 
FOR DUAL FUNDS, QUARTERLY 1967-1973 
Effective Leverage 
Nominal Leverage After Discount 
- or Premium 
r r F-Test r r F-Test 
American -.87 .76 72.4 -.68 .46 19.8 
Gemini -.95 .90 198.3 -.22 .05 1.1* 
Hemisphere -.68 .46 19.9 -.70 .49 25.5 
Income & 
Capi. Shares -.97 .95 403.1 -.49 .24 7.3 
Leverage Fd. 
of Boston -.96 .91 240.1 -.39 .15 4.0* 
Putnam -.89 . 79 87.8 -.43 .18 5.2* 
Scudder -.93 . 88 163.6 .08 .01 0.1* 
* F value not significant at .01 level. 
For six out of the seven funds, the coefficient of de¬ 
termination declines in the effective leverage regression. 
The seventh case. Hemisphere, represents an outlier since its 
total asset fluctuations were sizeable (see Table 6-1), and 
probably outside of a linear range (the' nominal leverage r^ 
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was .46). For the other six funds, on the other hand, nom- 
2 
inal leverage r 's ranged from .76 to .95 and effective lev- 
2 
erage r 's ranged from .01 to .46. In the most extreme case, 
Scudder, 88% of the changes in nominal leverage were related 
to changes in total assets, while 1% of the effective lever¬ 
age could be associated with total asset changes. For all 
six cases, less than one-half of effective leverage ratio 
changes were explained by changes in total assets. 
An additional explanatory variable could be that in¬ 
vestors use discounts and premiums to offset changes in the 
leverage ratio which occur with changes in total asset values. 
A variant of this explanation is found in the familiar "odd- 
lotter" theory. The Dual Fund buyer might be likened to the 
odd-lotter who was once thought to be buying and selling at 
the wrong time. 
More recent examination of odd-lotter behavior suggests 
that he is acting more rationally than irrationally. In its 
Business Bulletin, the Cleveland Trust Company examined odd- 
lot behavior from 1969 to 1972 and concluded, "... that at 
nearly every DJI Averages peak, odd-lot sales increased fast¬ 
er than purchases and near every DJI trough, purchases rose 
faster than sales. Thus in total, the small investors have 
2 
bought more at peaks." 
A more extensive study by Wu ends with the conclusion: 
"With regard to odd-lot behavior vis-a-vis price move¬ 
ments, simple linear regression for aggregate data 
from 1954-1966 was computed using changes in the Stan- 
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dard & Poor's Stock Price Composite Weekly Index as 
a dependent variable and weekly odd-lot trading as 
an independent variable. The results suggest, on 
average, odd-letters trade against the market, and, 
therefore were price stabilizers."-^ (emphasis added) 
This apparent tendency for small investors to trade 
against the market is consistent with a pattern of the dis¬ 
count widening as asset values increase, and the discount 
narrowing (or premiums setting in) as asset values decline. 
Contrary to popular impression, the discount might not be 
caused by declines in the stock market or poor investment 
performance, but by expectations that current investment re¬ 
sults will reverse themselves. Like the odd-lotter, the po¬ 
tential Dual Fund capital shareholder is betting that current 
trends will change direction. 
Such countercylical behavior would explain why the cap¬ 
ital shares of the outlier fund. Hemisphere, have sold at a 
premium in recent quarters despite an almost neglible net 
asset value. Currently, Hemisphere capital shares are more 
like warrants than a mutual fund. 
The countercyclical behavior was evidenced early in the 
history of Dual Funds. A writer in Fortune presented the 
following analysis of five Dual Funds three months after they 
were issued: 
"But while 4 out of 5 funds made increases in their* net 
asset values between April 14 and July 7, none of them 
gained in market value. 
Leverage Fund of Boston, which had the worst invest¬ 
ment performance - its net asset value per share dropped 
2.2 percent - had the best market performance. . . This 
was the only fund in the group that carried a premium 
on July 7. 
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If investors in Dual Fund capital shares act consistent¬ 
ly in a countercyclical manner and offset changes in nominal 
leverage, the effect of their discounting will make the effec¬ 
tive leverage curve flatter than the nominal leverage curve in 
the relevant range (see Figure 6-2). 
Table 6-3 contains the slope coefficients resulting from 
the time series regression of the two leverage factors on 
total assets. If investors are pricing Dual Funds counter- 
cyclicly, the slope of the effective leverage curve will be 
flatter because the discount will push the leverage curve up¬ 
ward when asset values increase, and premiums will push the 
curve downward as asset values decline. 
TABLE 6-3 
SLOPE OF REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS; QUARTERLY 
REGRESSION OF LEVERAGE RATIO ON TOTAL ASSETS 
FOR DUAL FUNDS 1967-1973 
Slope of 
Nominal 
Leverage t-Value 
Slope of 
Effective 
Leverage t-Value 
American -.12 -8.51 -.09 -4.46 
Gemini -.04 -14.08 -.02 -1.09 
Hemisphere -.61 -4.46 -.26 -4.74 
Income & Cap. 
Shares -.06 -20.08 -.10 -2.71 
Leverage Fd. 
of Boston -.08 -15.50 -.04 -2.01 
Putnam -.20 -9.37 -.12 -2.28 
Scudder -.13 -12.79 -.01 -0.36 
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In six out of seven cases, the slope coefficient is less 
for the time series regression of effective leverage on total 
assets. The fact that Income & Capital Shares Inc. effective lev¬ 
erage slope coefficient actually increases remains an excep¬ 
tion to the countercyclical investor theory. 
If the theory that Dual Fund capital shareholders behave 
like odd-lotters is valid, the discount (premium) can be ex¬ 
plained as follows. In a bull market the total assets of Dual 
Funds rise, but investors expect the market to reverse itself. 
To prepare for the expected bear market, some investors desire 
to avoid leveraged situations and therefore sell 
Dual Fund capital shares. As a result, the discount widens. 
In a bear market, on the other hand, the small investor is 
looking for leveraged situations in anticipation for the mar¬ 
ket recovery to come. In the latter case, there is a greater 
demand for leveraged Dual Funds capital shares, and the dis¬ 
count narrows or goes to a premium. 
In mid-19 70, after stock market indicies had suffered 
their largest decline since the Depression (some 35%), all of 
the seven Dual Fund capital shares were selling at a premium 
for the only time in their history. In the more recent 1973- 
5 
1974 bear market, a general premium is not yet evident. 
Since January 1, 19 74, there has been some narrowing of the 
discounts, and the two funds whose net asset values have de¬ 
clined the most in the current bear market. Hemisphere and 
American, have recently sold at premiums. 
Appraisal of Dual Fund Capital Shares 
The existence of a sizeable discount has a major impact 
on the prospective risk/return opportunity set for a potential 
investor in Dual Fund capital shares. A key feature of the 
funds is that they will mature at various dates between 1979 
and 1985. At maturity the Dual Fund capital shareholders 
will vote on the options of dissolving the fund and distribut¬ 
ing the net assets to capital shareholders (after redemption 
of income shares at par value), or continuing the fund as an 
open-end mutual fund. If the fund'is continued as an open-end 
fund, income shareholders would be invited to buy shares at 
their redemption value, while capital shareholders would buy 
shares at their net asset value. The open-end fund would of 
course continuously redeem shares at net asset value after the 
reorganized fund began operation. Therefore, whether the Dual 
Fund is dissolved or reorganized into an open-end fund, ulti¬ 
mate returns to capital shareholders will be based on ending 
net asset value, not the discounted market price. 
If past history is any guide, the discount will be arbi- 
traged away as maturity nears. Several closed-end funds have 
either liquidated assets or become open-end funds in recent 
years. From January 1, 1965 to October 7, 1965, the M.A. Hanna 
Investment Company sold at a discount which averaged between 
21% and 29% below net asset value. On October 8, 1965, the 
company announced liquidation plans, and by October 12 the 
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discount had declined to 2%. In 1967 two closed-end invest¬ 
ment companies, Boston Personal Property Trust and Consoli¬ 
dated Investors Trust, began redeeming their shares at net 
asset value. Their discounts, which had averaged 12% - 15% 
7 
declined to 2% - 4%. 
More recently, two of the twelve remaining diversified 
closed-end investment companies have merged with open-end mu¬ 
tual funds. The closed-end Surveyor Fund (1972 year end 
assets $174 million) announced a proposed merger with the 
open-end Eberstadt Fund on May 1, 1973. The merger was con- 
sumated on September 9, 1973. The arbitraged path of the dis¬ 
count for Surveyor Fund on selected dates in 1973 is shown in 
Figure 6-3. 
The Dominick Fund (1972 year-end assets $68 million) sold 
at a 29% discount from net asset value at the end of 1972. 
On November 28, 1973 Dominick management announced that it was 
actively seeking merger with an open-end fund. As of November 
26, 1973, Dominick's discount from net asset value was 29.5%. 
On June 6, 1974 Dominick management announced that Putnam In¬ 
vestor's Trust, a $440 million open-end fund, had agreed in 
principal to acquire Dominick Fund, subject to Dominick's 
shareholder's approval. Dominick's discount on selected dates 
since October 1, 1973, is graphed in Figure 6-4. 
Arbitragers will not allow disparities between market 
price and net asset value once there is a reasonable basis to 
estimate that an asset will sell at its underlying value. Of 
D
IS
C
O
U
N
T
 
FR
O
M
 
N
E
T
 A
S
S
E
T
 V
A
LU
E 
FO
R
 
SU
R
V
E
Y
O
R
 
FU
N
D
 
O LO O l-O o LO 
CO CM CM — ~ 
LU 
O 
cr 
LU 
Q_ 
_ LU 
O o ^ ^ O^LUC0_| 
Q F
IG
U
RE
 
6
-3
 
JA
NU
AR
Y 
I. 
19
73
 
- 
SE
PT
EM
BE
R 
9.
 
19
73
 
D
IS
C
O
U
N
T
 
FR
O
M
 
N
E
T
 A
S
S
E
T
 V
A
LU
E 
FO
R
 D
O
M
IN
IC
K
 
FU
N
D
 
LU ZD ^ H— (_jj 
Q: o , ^ GO 
LU ^ ^ <r 
CL. Q 
LU 
<1: 
FI
GU
RE
 6
-4
 
OC
TO
BE
R 
IJ
9
7
3
 
- 
JU
N
E 
21
,1
97
4 
132 
course, the management company of a Dual Fund can take action 
which can narrow the discount in the meantime. Instead of 
making new investments, the management can buy its own shares 
in the market at discount. This has the immediate effect of 
supporting the market price and holding the discount within 
bounds, but more importantly, it enhances remaining share¬ 
holders' net asset values, since other shareholders are being 
bought out below net asset value. 
Two of the Dual Funds have repurchased small amounts of 
their shares in the open market. Leverage Fund of Boston 
repurchased 5,400 of its 2 million shares outstanding in 1972 
and Scudder Duo-Vest repurchased 22,400 of its 5.5 million 
shares in the last three years. The potential favorable im¬ 
pact of capital share repurchase is diluted somewhat by the 
SEC's doctrine of "absolute fairness to both classes of share¬ 
holders" where management must retire an equal amount of both 
income and capital shares, even if the income shares are not 
selling below par value. 
Calculating Eventual Rates of Return for Capital Shareholders 
The second factor which determines rates of return for 
capital shareholders is the movement of common stock prices 
from now until maturity. A high probability can be attached 
to the eventual amortization of the discount, but any projec¬ 
tion concerning 1982 or 1985 common stock prices is sheer 
speculation and beyond the scope of this paper. As of mid-1974. 
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investors are placing relatively low valuations on the equi¬ 
ties of major corporations. Major problems include double¬ 
digit inflation and competitive high yields on bonds and 
short-term money market instruments. Perhaps the major con¬ 
cern of investors is the quality of corporate earning power 
and the ability to cover fixed costs in an inflationary en¬ 
vironment. 
Fisher and Lorie [51, 52] and Sharpe [136] show that in 
the long run, common stocks provide returns commensurate with 
their risk level even if the Great Depression is included 
in the sampling period. The question is whether the life¬ 
span of Dual Funds will be sufficient to coincide with the 
capital asset pricing model's long run. 
Figures 6-4 through 6-10 permit an investor to estimate 
possible rates of return from investing in capital shares of 
Dual Funds, given the eventual amortization of the discount. 
The graphs permit the investor to select his own estimate of 
the compound annual return on the Funds' total portfolios 
from mid-1974 to the termination date. A total asset port¬ 
folio beta of 1.0 is an approximate estimate for the Dual 
Funds, so the compound annual rate selected for total asset 
portfolios could Le an estimate for the S&P 500 Index (ex 
dividends) over the appropriate interval. The opportunity 
set curves in Figures 6-4 through 6-10 are the result of de¬ 
termining the compound annual or internal rate of return which 
equates current capital share values with the growth (decline) 
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of the total portfolio after redemption of income shareholder 
obligations. 
R.V. . 
1 
+ Arr.. 
1 
M.P. (6a) 
(l+r)"^ 
c 
where: 
M.P. = current market price of a capital share; 
T.A. = total assets of the portfolio (an income 
share plus a capital share) 
g = compound annual growth rate (decline) of 
total assets; 
r = compound annual rate of return for capital 
shareholder who holds to maturity; 
R.V.^. = redemption value of an income share; 
Arr.. = income dividend arrearage (if any) to be 
1 J J_ • J_ 
paid at maturity. 
To show the difference in the opportunity set before 
and after the discount, net asset value can be substituted 
for market price on the left hand side of equation (6a). The 
compound annual rate of return in both cases is obtained by 
solving (6a) for r, after estimating g. 
T.A.(1+g)^ - (R.V.^+Arr.^) 
(l+r)"^ 
T.A.(l+g)^ - (R.V.^+Arr.^) 
wrr. ' 
c 
ln[T.A.(1+g)^ - (R.V..+Arr..)]-In M.P. 
n 
In[T.A.(1+g)^-(R.V.^+Arr.^)]-lnM.P.^ 
r 
n 
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Because of current discounts, the effective opportunity 
sets for five Dual Fund Capital Shares are above their orig¬ 
inal 1967 opportunity sets. Gemini, Income & Capital Shares, 
Leverage Fund of Boston, Putnam Duofund and Scudder Duo-Vest 
currently sell at discounts ranging from 19.4% to 28.3% below 
net asset value. On the other hand, because of current high 
leverage factors, even the funds which sell at premiums have 
improved opportunity sets ^ their total asset portfolios have 
positive compound annual returns. 
TABLE 6-4 
DUAL FUND CAPITAL SHARE DISCOUNTS AS OF June 14, 1974 
Market 
price 
Net Asset 
Value Discount 
Arnerican $4.50 $4.48 0.4 (premium) 
Gemini 9.00 11.17 19.4 
Hemisphere 1.25 ~0 (premium) 
Income & Capital 5.25 7.26 27.6 
Leverage Fund 7.00 9.08 22.9 
Putnam Duofund 4.38 5.50 20.5 
Scudder Duo-Vest 6.00 8.37 28.3 
American Dual Vest sells at a slight premium to net asset 
value. American's total asset portfolio ! has shown the largest 
decline of any of the seven Dual Funds in the 1973-1974 bear 
market. American' s slight premium, compared to the five other 
Dual Fund discounts, supports the countercyclical investor 
theory. 
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A Hemisphere Fund capital share sells at a market price 
of approximately 1-1/4, while its net asset value is 0. The 
capital shares are in effect warrants or options on the chance 
that total portfolio assets will exceed income share obliga¬ 
tions by the time the fund terminates in 1985. It should be 
briefly noted that through 1972, Hemisphere was managed by 
Gerald Tsai, a famous "go-go" fund manager in the late 1960's. 
Hemisphere's total assets have lost half of their original 
value since 1967. This decline may be related to excessive 
security speculation in the early years of Hemisphere fund. 
Other Dual Fund managers appear to have followed more con¬ 
servative portfolio strategies in keeping with their leveraged 
capital structures. Currently, Hemisphere Fund is managed by 
CNA Management Corporation, which maintains an extremely con¬ 
servative portfolio of 61% cash and short-term investments, 
and 19% corporate bonds. 
For the remaining five funds which sell at sizeable dis¬ 
counts, eventual rates of return will be determined by the 
interaction of the discount and the leverage factor. Dis¬ 
counts enhance returns for capital shareholders if total 
assets increase, and modify any declines in total assets. 
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TABLE 6-5 
POTENTIAL COMPOUND ANNUAL RATES OF RETURN FOR 
CAPITAL SHARES AS OF JUNE 14, 1974 
Compound Rates 
Of Return for 
Capital Shares Range of Compound 
for Total 
Annual 
Assets 
Rates of Return 
-.02 0 .05 .10 .145 
American -.07 -.02 • CO
 
. 31 .40 
Gemini -.03 .02 .11 .18 .23 
Hemisphere -.10 -.10 .18 .29 . 37 
Income & Capital -.02 .036 .14 .23 .29 
Leverage Fd. -.02 .035 .14 .23 . 30 
Putnam -.05 .018 .13 .22 .29 
Scudder -.004 .044 .14 .22 .28 
Possible annual rates of return for capital shareholders 
for a given range of total asset compound annual returns are 
presented in Table 6-5. The table is based on an arbitrary 
date, June 14, 1974, but the results seem to support the the¬ 
ory that investors use discounts and premiums to tip the lev¬ 
erage factor in their favor. Note that after discounts and 
premiums, the range of possible annual returns to maturity 
for the capital shareholders of the seven funds is quite sim¬ 
ilar. On the basis of competitive Dual Fund rates of return, 
premiums on American and Hemisphere are not illogical. The 
large decline in their portfolios causes a high leverage 
ratio which is desirable in any market upturn. 
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Summary 
The following paragraphs contain a summary of the re¬ 
sults of Chapter VI. 
(1) The discounts of Dual Fund capital shares appear to re¬ 
sult from institutional barriers to information and the inter¬ 
action of the leverage factor with investor expectations. 
(2) Piece-wise linear regression (time series) was used to re¬ 
gress Dual Fund nominal leverage ratios and effective lever¬ 
age ratios (after discounts and premiums) on fund total assets. 
The result was that total asset changes account for less of 
the change in the effective leverage ratio than the nominal 
leverage ratio. Additional variables are needed to explain 
changes in effective leverage. 
(3) There is an indication that the discounts and premiums 
act as mechanisms to flatten out the negative leverage curve. 
This would imply that investors price Dual Fund capital shares 
in a countercyclical manner, offsetting normal changes in lev¬ 
erage related to changes in total assets. 
(4) Since Dual Funds have a definite maturity, any discount 
is likely to be arbitraged away by the maturity date. Dis¬ 
counts on other closed-end funds have disappeared when they 
terminated or became open-end. 
(5) The existence of any discount enhances the eventual rates 
of return for potential capital shareholders who buy the dis¬ 
counted shares and hold until maturity. On the other hand. 
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the two funds which sell at premiums will yield similar re¬ 
turns if total asset returns are positive. In the latter 
case, this is possible because of an enhanced leverage factor. 
I 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS 
Summary of Investment Performance Results 
The result of an empirical regression of return on risk 
over the period 1967 to 1973 indicates that the performance 
of risky (relatively high beta) mutual funds was below that 
predicted by a two-point, ex-post security market line, while 
low beta mutual funds experienced performance above the ex¬ 
pected level. This conclusion was reinforced by a non-para- 
metric Jonckheere test which compared performance across 
three different levels of risk. Therefore, one of the strong¬ 
est implications of this research is that low risk mutual 
funds outperformed high risk mutual funds during the sampling 
period. Such a finding is consistent with several prior 
studies indicating that risk-adjusted portfolio returns de¬ 
teriorated as risk level increased. 
One explanation of why risky stocks and portfolios do 
not yield returns commensurate with their risk level is that large 
numbers of aggressive investors, seeking above-average returns, 
over-inflate the prices of risky securities. This would ex¬ 
plain the apparent tendency for mutual funds which buy risky 
stocks to yield lower long run risk-adjusted rates of return. 
Dual Fund capital shares, however, use leverage in order to 
achieve high risk portfolios. The Jonckheere test was incon¬ 
clusive as to the relative performance rankings of the seven 
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Dual Funds. However, another non-parametric test compared 
Dual Fund rankings to the rankings of seven random funds from 
the ninety-four fund sample. In ten separate non-overlapping 
comparisons, there was no significant difference in the per¬ 
formance rankings of the leveraged Dual Funds and ten differ¬ 
ent groups of random funds. 
The results thus far suggest that mutual funds which seek 
high risk-high potential reward portfolios should utilize lev¬ 
erage rather than risky stock selection. Furthermore, the 
finding that low risk funds appear to generate returns greater 
than expected from their risk level implies a strategy of 
leveraging low risk funds. 
To test this strategy, a non*parametric pair-wise compari¬ 
son was made between the performance of the seven actual Dual 
Funds and seven hypothetical Dual Funds. The latter group 
was chosen on the basis of the seven lowest portfolio betas 
in the sample of ninety-four funds. These seven low beta 
funds were artificially set up as leveraged Dual Fund capital 
shares and their hypothetical performance compared to the ac¬ 
tual Dual Funds from 1967 to 1973. The results of the compar¬ 
ison did not indicate that leveraging low beta portfolios 
(range .70 to .85) yields higher risk-adjusted returns than 
leveraging moderate beta portfolios (range .81 to 1.26). 
The risk-adjusted performance of the Dual Fund capital 
shares was then compared to the performance of their respec¬ 
tive total asset portfolios (i.e.. the leverage factor re- 
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moved). The results did not suggest that capital shareholders 
would have experienced better performance by "undoing" the 
leverage, which would be the equivalent of buying an equal 
number of capital and income shares. 
The conclusions regarding the comparison of Dual Fund 
capital shares and hypothetical Dual Funds, and the comparison 
of capital shares with their respective total asset portfolios, 
are among the least reliable in this study. The fact that it 
was not possible to reject the null hypothesis of no differ¬ 
ence in performance in one particular pair-wise comparison is 
not particularly conclusive. Specifically, further research 
is necessary before the strategy of leveraging low beta port¬ 
folios is rejected. 
On the other hand, the results of a comparison of the per¬ 
formance of Dual Fund capital share net asset values and their 
respective market prices strongly indicate that the market 
lowered both the risk and return of Dual Funds. This result 
is not particularly surprising since Dual Funds have sold at 
discounts to net asset value for most of their seven year his¬ 
tory. 
In summary, this study presents limited empirical support 
for Tobin's pioneering 1958 article where he showed that com¬ 
binations of a market portfolio, and borrowing and lending 
the risk-free asset, result in a new efficient frontier. This 
linear frontier dominates the original Markowitz quadratic 
efficient frontier which is made up of diversified risky se- 
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curity portfolios. 
Those who have questioned the validity of the capital 
asset pricing model because of empirical deviations from the 
theoretical model should reconsider their conclusion in view 
of this evidence.^ The substitution of leveraged high risk 
portfolios for "risky-stock" high risk portfolios appears to 
result in a more reliable validation of the model. The re¬ 
sults of this study, while limited in generality because of 
small population size, suggest that when leverage is used to 
obtain high risk portfolios, the expectations of the capital 
asset pricing model bear a greater correspondence to reality 
than has been found in past studies. 
Investor Reactions to Leverage 
Because of a constant amount of income dollars leverag¬ 
ing, a fluctuating amount of capital shareholder dollars. Dual 
Fund leverage is inversely related to changes in the total 
portfolio's value. The negative relationship is approximate¬ 
ly linear over the range which Dual Fund portfolio values 
have fluctuated. Time series linear regression was used to 
test the strength of the relationship of leverage ratios and 
total asset changes. For each of the seven Dual Funds, the 
nominal leverage ratio and the effective leverage ratio (after 
discount or premium) were regressed on total portfolio assets. 
The nominal leverage ratio produced high coefficients of de- 
termination (r range .46 to .95). On the other hand, effec- 
152 
tive leverage ratio coefficients of determination tended to 
2 
be low (r range .01 to .49). These results indicate that 
there are other variables responsible for changes in the 
effective leverage ratio. 
Excunination of the slope coefficients of the two time 
series leverage regressions revealed that for six out of 
seven Dual Funds the negative slope of the effective lever¬ 
age curve was flatter than the nominal leverage curve. It 
appears that the market offsets the "natural" leverage changes 
of the funds. This would imply that investors discount net 
asset values of capital shares as fund assets rise in order 
to maintain leverage, and use premiums to modify increasing 
leverage as fund assets fall. 
The rationale for such investor behavior was found in 
the "odd-lotter" theory of countercyclical investor behavior. 
Past research contains evidence that odd-lotters tend to be 
net sellers at market peaks, and net buyers at troughs. Sim¬ 
ilarly, Dual Fund capital shareholders tend to be net sellers 
when fund assets rise because the leverage feature is less 
attractive. Therefore, the capital shares become discounted. 
When fund assets fall in value, investors desire the higher 
leverage because of countercyclical expectations that the 
market will rise, and the capital shares go to a premium. 
An alternative explanation is that Dual Fund capital 
shareholders are practicing a crude form of rebalanc' As 
a formal portfolio strategy, rebalancing requires the main- 
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tenance of a fixed proportion of one's assets in each securi¬ 
ty in the portfolio over a given investment time horizon. The 
strategy is implemented by selling stocks in the portfolio 
which have risen over a given decision interval, and buying 
those stocks in the portfolio which have fallen. Such re¬ 
balancing would be consistent with the fact that the two Dual 
Funds which have shown the largest decline in value sell at 
premiums, while the other five sell at discounts. As Cheng 
and Deets conclude, "Realistically, most investors follow some 
2 
form of rebalancing." 
Implications of Current Dual Fund Market Price/Net Asset 
Relationships 
Examination of potential returns for capital shareholders 
to maturity indicates that the outcomes for all seven Dual 
Funds tend to converge, even though two funds sell at premi¬ 
ums and five funds at discounts. This would imply that dis¬ 
counts and premiums are used by investors as a systematic and 
logical evaluative pricing device. 
For each fund, the opportunity set for potential investors 
in capital shares is greater than the opportunity set when the 
funds were created. Consideration of the fund with the larg¬ 
est premium and the fund with the largest discount will illus¬ 
trate the improved opportunity set. Hemisphere Fund capital 
shares are similar to warrants, selling at 1-1/4 with net 
asset value of 0. However, the buyer of a Hemisphere "warrant" 
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is in effect borrowing $11.44 of income shareholder assets on 
the expectation that by 1985 these assets will appreciate to 
an amount greater than $11.44 plus the present value of $1.25. 
This is similar to borrowing $11.44 for twelve years at an 
interest cost of $1.25, which is equal to one year's interest 
cost at the current prime rate. 
At the other extreme are Scudder Duo-Vest capital shares 
at 28.3% below net asset value. The discount magnifies the 
leverage factor for any possible portfolio gains and absorbs 
part of any portfolio declines.^ 
Potential returns for Dual Fund capital shares must be 
viewed in the context of a 10% long term corporate bond mar¬ 
ket, and a 12% short term money market. Any relative invest¬ 
ment merit of Dual Fund capital shares is based on the assump¬ 
tion that 1974 may represent a trough phase in an equity mar¬ 
ket with an upward secular bias. If this assumption is not 
reasonable, high risk leveraged equity funds are not appro¬ 
priate investment alternatives. 
Are Dual Funds a Practical Investment Medium? 
One of the strongest implications of this research is 
that Dual Funds provide a valuable service to the small in¬ 
vestor. This is based on the finding that investors desir¬ 
ing high risk portfolios may have experienced better risk- 
adjusted performance by holding leveraged Dual Funds than by 
"risky-stock" mutual funds. By buying varying amounts of 
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capital and income shares, a Dual Fund holder can place him¬ 
self at a relatively conservative or aggressive position on 
the efficient frontier. An aggressive investor would of 
course buy all capital shares, and in the most extreme case 
even margin his capital shares. ^ 
The results of this study also imply that Dual Funds 
should hold asset portfolios with betas no greater than 1, 
given their leveraged capital structure. While no quantita¬ 
tive evidence was presented, there appears to be some basis 
to think that the dismal performance of Hemisphere Fund cap¬ 
ital shares was due in part to the inclusion of excessively 
speculative securities in its portfolio. 
If leverage is preferable to risky security selection 
to attain high risk/high reward portfolios, there should be 
some institutional vehicle for the small investor to use 
leverage since he is sometimes institutionally constrained 
from borrowing. Yet no Dual Funds have started since 1967, 
and no institution is likely to offer one while five of the 
current funds sell at sizeable discounts. 
This study concludes that Dual Purpose Funds are a valid' 
r 
investment concept, if their asset portfolio risk is approx¬ 
imately equal to that of a market portfolio. However, given 
the existence of capital share discounts, the issuance of new 
Dual Funds is unlikely. A structural change would be required 
to revive interest in the Dual Fund concept. 
One possible structural change is to make the income 
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shares closed-end or fixed in number, and the capital shares 
open-end. Since the capital shares would be redeemable at 
net asset value, discounts would not exist. The results of 
this study suggest that investors would react to declining 
leverage as assets rise by selling capital shares. There¬ 
fore, as assets rise, the Dual Funds would experience redemp¬ 
tions of capital shares. However, an equilibrium situation 
would be restored because the effect of redemptions would be 
to increase the leverage factor which in turn would counter¬ 
act investor sentiment to redeem shares. In other words, in¬ 
vestor reactions would restore a leverage equilibrium. 
Such an arrangement would probably be carefully scrutin¬ 
ized by the SEC since it evidenced great concern over pro¬ 
tection of the income shares in 1967. Redemption of capital 
shares would reduce the asset coverage of income share par 
value, and lower the current income earning base. The SEC 
could hypothesize a "run" on the capital shares in a bear 
market. However, this research indicates no such "run". 
Odd-lotter behavior suggests that redemptions would dry up 
during a bear market, and that there would be a net demand 
for Dual Fund capital shares. Therefore, there might be a 
provision in the fund's by-laws whereby a fund which had ex¬ 
perienced redemptions could restore a 2:1 leverage ratio by 
5 
issuing more shares when demand was sufficient. 
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Limitations of Research Results 
Chapter II presented studies which questioned the use¬ 
fulness of risk-adjusted portfolio performance measures 
largely on the ground that the assumptions underlying the 
capital asset pricing model are seldom met in the real world. 
In addition there are empirical problems inherent in measur¬ 
ing mutual fund performance. 
However, the chief limitation on the generality of the 
results of this study is likely to be the small Dual Fund 
population size. Since there are only seven such funds com¬ 
pared to larger sub-samples in the ninety-four mutual fund 
sample, the Dual Funds could be considered outliers in the 
total sample. The principal results of this study must al¬ 
ways be qualified with the phrase that the performance of 
Dual Funds provides "limited empirical support" for the 
effectiveness of leverage in maintaining high risk portfolio 
strategies. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
One of the principal questions left unresolved by this 
study was the appropriate level of risk for a Dual Fund's 
asset portfolio. The tentative conclusion was that high 
beta assets should be avoided and that the portfolio beta of 
one, suggested by the work of Markowitz, Tobin, Lintner, et 
al., was appropriate. 
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This study was inconclusive as to the results of lever¬ 
aging low risk portfolios. A more comprehensive test of a 
strategy of leveraging low beta versus moderate beta port¬ 
folios is required. To accomplish this, two fairly large 
samples of mutual funds, divided into low and moderate beta 
groups, could be artificially leveraged and results compared 
over a given holding period. 
Finally, the results of this study demonstrate that in¬ 
tensive study of small populations is a research strategy 
which appears to be warranted in the field of finance. 
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Footnotes 
Bower and Wippern [18] are among those who raise ques¬ 
tions regarding the use of the capital asset pricing model 
in portfolio performance evaluation. 
2 
P.L. Cheng and M.K. Deets, "Portfolio Returns and the 
Random Walk Theory," Journal of Finance (26:1) March, 1971, 
p. 26. 
3 
It should be noted that since income share minimum 
dividend rates were set in 1967, the range of 4% to 7% is 
equivalent to borrowing below the risk-free rate in 1974, 
4 
Since capital shares of six Dual Funds are listed on 
the NYSE, they fall under the Federal Reserve Board's usual 
margin requirements. 
5 
As this chapter was being prepared, a paper by Black 
and Scholes [11] was received. They describe the marketing, 
operating and legal problems of the Wells Fargo Bank in 1973 
in its attempt to set up a leveraged market portfolio fund 
(asset beta of one, with constant leverage). The fund was 
to be distributed to institutional investors only. Black and 
Scholes conclude that innovation in finance is expensive and 
risky. The experience of Dual Purpose Funds appears to bear 
them out. 
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Appendix A 
Computer Programs 
1. Program FDATA - Calculates fund quarterly returns 
(equation 3a). 
2. Program STATS2 - Regression program for each fund's 
returns relative to the S&P 500 
Index returns. 
3. Program MKTVL - Algorithm for calculating Dual Fund 
capital share compound annual returns 
with a given range of total asset 
portfolio annual growth (decline) 
rates. 
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Program FDATA 
10 DIM X(?5,4) 
11 PRINT "TVoe in THT 4-DIG IT FUND NUMPER" 
12 IN^UT F 
20 ORINT “AS EACH *> A^^EARS TYPE IN THE PEG INNING AND“ 
30 ^RINT “THE ENDING ASSET ^rALUE“ 
40 PRINT “♦*>^AKE SURE THAT YOU HAVE ASSIGNED THE FILE NAME" 
50 FOR J=1 TO 25 
55 ^RINT “G'UARTER“; J 
60 IN^UT X(J,1) 
70 IN^UT X(J,2) 
80 X(J,3)= (X(J,2)/X(J,1 )) -1.0 
82 X(J,3)=100*X(J,3) 
85 X(J,4)=F 
100 NEXT J 
110 ^RINT “THE FOLLO^'MNG IS FO^ CHECKING ®UROOSES“ 
120 PRINT “^?^DO NOT VERIFY THE DATA AS IF “ 
130 tJPiNT “THIS LOOKS voQNrgn.^- 
140 oojnt 
145 PRINT “FUND ; F 
150 oRINT“DUARTER“; “BEG“; “END“; “+ CHG“ 
160 FOR J=1 TO 25 
170 ooinT using 1 so,J,XCj,1 ),X(J,2),XCj, 3) 
180 FIELD(F4.0,2F9.2,FO.3) 
190 NEXT J 
20 0 op. int “IF THE AROVE DATA IS CORRECT, TY^E OK “j 
210 PRINT “IF IT IS INCORRECT TY^E NO“ 
220 INotjT 
230 IF Z^=“OK“ THEM 350 
240 opiNT “QUARTER NO.=“; 
250 INOUT J 
260 PRINT “REG. VALUE=“; 
270 INOUT X( J,l) 
2 80 opiNT “end VALUE=“; 
290 INotjT X(J,2) 
300 X(J,3) = X(J,2)/X(J, 1 )-l . 0 
305 X(J,3)=1OO^XCJ,3) 
310 opiNT “any more ERRORS'^ (NO,YES)“; 
320 INotjT Z^ 
330 IF Z<^=“YES“ THEN 240 
340 GO TO 145 
350 FOR J= 1 TO 25 
360 l^niTE (1) X(J,1),X(J,2),X(J,3),XCJ,4) 
370 NEXT J 
380 END 
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Program STATS2 
0 FC^ J=1 70 05 
0 FE/^DCn J, 1) ,X( J, 2) ,X( J, 2) ,XC J 
W F=R+X(^;t.2V.. ■ 
1C C^EX 1 
20 cir-: Yc 
30 pryA 
AO  = 
5 ADC1 
60 E=R+X(, 
*70 
7,1 
{'• 1 
4
1
^
 
80 P=P/25 
90 
92 FCP K= 
93 C,D,r:,' 
9A A=:0 
95 FC^ J = 
:?■, 2r),v(> n • 
DFALirS vith Y r\*T V 
rt 
j h. '-'Y ^ ah* 
110 A=A+YCJ,2) 
“rp'(mrxT“j 
130 A=A/2^ 
T ^ 25 lAO FOP' J=1 _ ....
150 C=C+X(J,3)^YCJ,3) 
160 D = D+xTJ, 3)-’? 
170 G = G + (:C ( J , 3)-?) to. C 
TTTTr^+Y^fJTsr-A 
n 
20 0 ■ F=F+C(X(J "'5 ^ _ P) -*• (Y(J,3 ) - A) ) 
210 NEXT J . 
2'2C £ir.* n F Y IS IN A 
230 E E K K E A >? n V IS IN n - 
2A0 Fl = .^7r-CH/ 2A) 
250 F2=r^^(3/ P4) - 
25 5 1- * *> • w « PE5' V • IS I^: 51 
26 0 PEK-^'^FTD. DEX. c~ X IS I r: s 2 
27(J^ T= CC-C25 ^ ^ 4- C r' 4 ))/ H) 
2?0 TT tr o- ^ ■ 
290 PFK-*''^? 15 IN F T * • • c *7 J ^ • V> ^ 
30 0 P1=F/^ 
3 1 0 j,pppp I 5 IX El 
320 rpv A] IS IX C: 1 
33 0 Ar=A-?l-‘ 
3A0 53=c:-i-(F-^~)/^ )/ 2 
'5 0 FEX 
360 El= 5^7(53 (_1J 
>.^-IAr:CE CF FIT IF ix" c O 
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37 n 
380 
FEF++S7D. E 
DEF ++S7D. 
^rcrCF FETA IS IF El 
rp jc 
590 
4 1 C 
E?=S^“CS.? + C C 1/'5)-^CF'^F)/D-) ) 
T=c '"'/sop ( 1 _-c) ) P3) 
420 pTv ^ ct I F I • E 2 
4?n p r K' j. : rp L T ’ E CE -ETA IS ly 
440 rrv at :• « * > • * I '. E ^E AL’^HA. IS IN T1 
44 p J1=A-C 1 . P5-*- C ! - FI) 
4 5 0 7 1=A1/E2 
46 0 P P=: T-l-T 
470 UFIT'EC 3)^'C J , 4 ) , A , S 1 , F, Pp , F 1 , A I , E 1 , T, F2,7 1 , F G , SC , J 1 
480 ^^IK7 usir:^ 626,YCJ,4) 
490 ^Pir'^7 usir.’P 6 3 0 , A 
500 ^FI?JT TTSIFP 640,51 
510 D c T • T c- T vr: 650 , F 
520 PPIFT US IF9 655,S2 
c; '3 n w w «> ?pir;7 usiuG -560 ,? 
54 0 0':rTV'r T’CTrrr • X* * ..•^X**^' 67 0,P2 
550 pfi:j7 using 680,FI 
56 0 PPIFT USING c 9 0 . A 1 
570 P’“IFT USING 70^,E1 
SBC PPINT USI^!G •:^in,T 
590 
600 
61C 
615 
62C 
6?6 
^?IFT 
pp I Mp 
^rfFT " 
'?P TrjT 
FI5LDC 
US INC- 
US_IUB__7/}_C , T 1 
’’SIM'p 750 ,F2 
rSIXF '?5 5,S? 
U5IFS 760,J1 
~ T^’T-.T r.rr: 
630 EIELDC” Y FA~=“,F8.4) 
640 FIELDC" CT^ v_“" trc a \ 
■650 FIELDC “ nr* A ^ • — -w* f i ^ % •-t / 
655 FIELDC“ STD OF F9.4) * 
660 FIELDC“ -=“,r6.3) V. 
6^0 FIELDC" ;■ -:: - = , ." o . j ) 
68 0 
690 
7 0 0~ 
710 
7 9C“ 
7^0 
FIFLDC 
_FIELDC 
FI eld'C‘ 
_FIELD( 
FIELDC 
C T ITT 
• ▲ . . ^ V 
75 C 
75 5 
"7 6 0 
765 
'7 6 6’ 
76 7 
FIFLDC 
FIELDC 
FIELDC 
75-1 f? 
’^Dir-:? 
pr I f.rp 
FETP= ,F9./4) 
A L ^ >: A = “, “ 9 ^4) _ _ _ 
SE'C^ =E^A=“7^9.4) 
S' DF FE':'A = “,F9.4) 
'SE OF AL’^HA = “, F9.4 ) 
T CF AL-HA=~,F?.4) 
F-7E5T=“,F9.4) 
'/•A? TF F!7 = -,~A.Zi) 
J-S7A7=“,F^.4) 
77 0 UF'C'^ K 
7?0 END 
Program MKTVL 
10 
20 
30 
40 
42 
44 
46 
48 
50 
55 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
1 10 
1 12 
1 20 
1 30 
IMT 
IKJOTJT 
n-q TMT 
op INT 
IMOTJT 
PP I^JT 
IMPuT 
PP xMT 
IMPTJT 
IMPTJT M.p, 
M 
IMOTyr t.A. 
IMPUT P.V. 
.R 
INPUT APPRAPS' 
IMPTJT M‘ 
M 
FOP G=-0.07 TO 0.15 STEP 
A1 =L0G(T^( l+G)'rM-P-A) 
P=L0G(M) 
C=(A1-P)/M 
P1=EXP<C)-1 
PPIMT USING 1 12,PI,G 
FIELDC2F8.4) 
NEXT G 
END 
0.005 
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Appendix B 
Data File 
Listing of quarterly returns for each of the 101 funds in 
the sample. 
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